United Nations A/71/636–S/2016/994

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
7 December 2016

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 32
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Identical letters dated 23 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the third quarterly report (for the period July-September 2016) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the human rights situation in the occupied regions of Georgia (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 32, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kaha **Imnadze**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-21187 (E) 161216

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 23 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Third Quarterly Report (July-September 2016) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Regions of Georgia

Contents

		Page
I.	Introduction	3
II.	Freedom from Torture and Ill-treatment	11
III.	Arbitrary Detention	12
IV.	Freedom of Movement	14
V.	Right to Property	16
VI.	Right to Education in the Native Language	18
VII.	Conclusions	19
VIII.	Appeal to the International Community	20

I. Introduction

Aims of the Report and Methodology Applied

1. In January 2015 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia started preparation of quarterly reports aiming at assessing the human rights situation in the occupied regions of Georgia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia prepared four such reports in 2015. This is the third quarterly report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia for the year 2016 covering the period of July-September 2016. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia will further continue the preparation of such reports on a quarterly basis. This reporting exercise aims to contribute to the provision of regular and updated information to the international community, to states as well as to international intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, on the human rights situation in the occupied regions of Georgia.

2. As for the applied methodology, this reporting exercise consolidates and assesses existing information from various open sources, national and international, on violations of human rights in the occupied regions of Georgia. Due to limitations on its length, the report does not aim to collect/contain information on all cases of violations of human rights in the occupied regions of Georgia; it aims to consolidate and assess only some of the most known examples of violations. The methodology applied does not provide for the conduct of fact-finding visits to the occupied regions of Georgia, nor to the conduct of interviews. Therefore the methodology applied does not enable this reporting exercise to collect and produce new data on the human rights situation in the occupied regions of Georgia.

Responsibility of the Occupying Power for Human Rights Violations

3. While the territories of two regions of Georgia — Abkhazia, Georgia and the Tskhinvali Region, Georgia are occupied by the Russian Federation, human rights situation in these regions of Georgia remains alarming. The Russian Federation as the occupying power, exercises effective control over Abkhazia, Georgia and the Tskhinvali Region, Georgia. These two regions still remaining under foreign military occupation, constitute above all dangerous "black holes" in terms of holding the human rights violators accountable. The occupying power, exercising effective control, has been preventing numerous international organizations from entering Abkhazia, Georgia and the Tskhinvali Region, Georgia.

4. During the reporting period, namely at the Twenty-Fifth Annual Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, held from 1st to 5th July 2016, "Resolution on the Conflict in Georgia" was adopted.[1] According to the adopted resolution, "the Russian Federation remains in breach of International Law ... by continuing the policy of occupation and creeping annexation of the regions of Georgia - Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia".[2] The resolution "[u]rges the Russian Federation to ... stop occupation of the territories of Georgia."[3] The resolution attested "the grave

[1] *Resolution on the Conflict in Georgia*, Twenty-Fifth Annual Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Tbilisi, Georgia, 1-5 July 2016, pages 25-26, available at <https://www.oscepa.org/documents/all- documents/annual-sessions/2016-tbilisi/declaration-24/3371-tbilisi-declaration-eng/file>.

[2] *See* paragraph 6.

[3] *See* paragraph 12.

humanitarian and human rights situation in the occupied regions of Georgia – Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia."[4]

5. During the reporting period, namely on 29 September 2016, at the 33rd Session of the UN Human Rights Council, "Joint Statement on Georgia"[5] was made on behalf of 46 countries.[6] According to the Joint Statement, "[t]he international community remains deeply concerned by the human rights and humanitarian situation in both Georgian regions and the repeated denial of access to international actors, including Special Procedures and regional organizations to the regions. The above document further states "[w]e recall the UN High Commissioner's assessment of the situation in both regions, during the last visit to Georgia in May 2014 and the refusal of those in control to allow the OHCHR the access to these regions. We continue to call for safe and unhindered access by international and regional human rights mechanisms to both regions for the benefit of all conflict-affected persons and those in need of protection. It is of an utmost importance to assist international monitors in concluding an objective and independent reporting of the situation on the ground."[7]

6. During the reporting period, namely on 13th September 2016, Mr Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, while addressing the 33rd Session of the UN Human Rights Council, declared the following "I am deeply concerned over the repeated refusals to permit access for my staff to both Abkhazia and South Ossetia by those in effective control — despite the Secretary-General's emphasis on the importance of that access in the context of the Geneva International Discussions. We continue to receive allegations of violations, including killings, arbitrary detentions, torture and ill-treatment and restricted freedom of movement. Other serious concerns include unresolved queries regarding missing persons and persistent difficulties regarding access to livelihood, education, property rights and administrative documentation, as well as the need to ensure the space for civil society and independent media."[8]

7. It should be emphasized that in "Resolution on the Conflict in Georgia", the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly stated that the EUMM is the sole international monitoring mechanism on the ground and is "regrettably unable to fulfil its mandate fully, while denied access to the occupied regions of Georgia - Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia."[9] In the same resolution, the OSCE Parliamentary

[4] *See* paragraph 7.

[5] *Joint Statement on Georgia*, 33rd Session of the UN Human Rights Council, 29 September 2016.

[6] *List of Countries*: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the UK, the USA.

[7] *Joint Statement on Georgia*, 33rd Session of the UN Human Rights Council, 29 September 2016.

[8] Opening Statement by Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Council 33rd Session, Geneva, 13 September 2016, available at <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/GlobalHumanRightsUpdate.aspx>.

[9] *Resolution on the Conflict in Georgia*, Twenty-Fifth Annual Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Tbilisi, Georgia, 1-5 July 2016, pages 25-26, paragraph 10, available at <https://www.oscepa.org/documents/all- documents/annual-sessions/2016-tbilisi/declaration-24/3371-tbilisi-declaration-eng/file>.

Assembly urged "the Russian Federation to ... allow international human rights monitoring on the ground".[10]

8. The Council of Europe prepared its 14th Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia describing, *inter alia*, human rights situation in Abkhazia, Georgia and the Tskhinvali Region, Georgia, and covering the period between April 2016 and September 2016.[11] It should be noted that the delegation of the secretariat of the Council of Europe carried out a fact-finding visit to Georgia on 12-13 September 2016 for the purpose of the consolidated report, however was not allowed to visit Abkhazia, Georgia and the Tskhinvali region, Georgia.[12]

9. Occupation policy of the Russian Federation regarding the territory of Georgia deprives several hundreds of thousands of IDPs of their internationally recognized right to a voluntary, safe and dignified return to places of their permanent residence. According to the Council of Europe, "[a]s regards the right of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to a safe, dignified and voluntary return, regrettably no progress can be reported."[13] In "Resolution on the Conflict in Georgia", the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly expressed "concern about the humanitarian situation of the internally displaced persons and refugees, continuously being deprived of the right to voluntary, safe, dignified, and unhindered return to their places of origin, as well as the right to property".[14] In the same resolution, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly urged "the Russian Federation to allow the safe, dignified, and unhindered return of all internally displaced persons and refugees to their places of origin".[15]

10. It should be noted that during the reporting period, namely from 26th to 29th September 2016, Mr Chaloka Beyani, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons visited Georgia, but was not allowed to visit the occupied regions of Georgia.

11. As already described in the second quarterly report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia covering the period of April-June 2016, in May 2016 the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) Ambassador Herbert Salber commissioned an independent Senior Expert, Mr. Thomas Hammerberg, to assess the human rights situation in Abkhazia, Georgia. It should be recalled that this initiative is based on humanitarian considerations and is in line with EU's non-recognition and engagement policy; it is launched under the human rights component of the EUSR's mandate. According to the agreed modalities, Senior Expert, Mr. Thomas Hammerberg will prepare a report for the EUSR in the autumn 2016, based on several study visits to Tbilisi, Zugdidi, Sokhumi and Gali. During

[10] *See* paragraph 17.

[11] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (April 2015-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf(2016) 37.

[12] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (April 2015-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf(2016) 37, paragraph 5.

[13] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (April 2015-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf(2016) 37, paragraph 61.

[14] *Resolution on the Conflict in Georgia*, Twenty-Fifth Annual Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Tbilisi, Georgia, 1-5 July 2016, pages 25-26, paragraph 8, available at <https://www.oscepa.org/documents/all- documents/annual-sessions/2016-tbilisi/declaration-24/3371-tbilisi-declaration-eng/file>.

[15] *See* paragraph 17.

the reporting period, namely between 9 and 17 May 2016, between 8 and 17 June 2016 and between 15 and 23 September 2016, Mr. Thomas Hammerberg visited Tbilisi, Zugdidi, Sokhumi, Gali and other districts of Abkhazia region. It should be noted here that the above initiative poses one-time assessment by the independent expert and it does not imply a regular monitoring or fact finding mechanism. Besides, it does not aim to assess the human rights situation in Tskhinvali region, Georgia.

12. It should be recalled here that during the reporting period of the second quarterly report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia covering the period of April-June 2016, namely on 19 May 2016 Mr. Giga Otkhozoria, was murdered by so called "border guards" deployed along the occupation line with Abkhazia. The murder was committed in the village of Khurcha, Zugdidi district, located in the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia. The murderer of Mr. Giga Otkhozoria has been identified — Mr. Rashid Kanji-Ogli. Mr. Rashid Kanji-Ogli and his accomplices fled to the occupied territory of Abkhazia immediately after committing the murder. The Prosecutor's Office of Georgia filed charges against Mr. Rashid Kanji-Ogli for the premeditated murder of Mr. Giga Otkhozoria and criminal prosecution was launched under the Criminal Code of Georgia. However under the existing circumstances, during the reporting period of the present report, it was still impossible for Georgia's Prosecutor's Office as well as for the courts of common jurisdiction of Georgia to deliver justice. Thus throughout the reporting period of the present report, Mr. Rashid Kanji-Ogli and his accomplices remained unpunished. It should be noted that during the reporting period Mr. Khajimba publicly declared that Mr. Rashid Kanji-Ogli would not be handed over to the Georgian side.[16] The above situation with regard to the violation of the right to life of Mr. Giga Otkhozoria once again demonstrates that the occupied territories of Georgia remain "black holes" in terms of holding the violators of human rights accountable. The above situation further reaffirms the need of immediate, unhindered and continuous access of international human rights monitoring mechanisms in the occupied territories of Georgia.

Occupation Line and Installation of Barbed Wire Fences and other Artificial Obstacles

13. The occupation line along the administrative boundary line (ABL) with Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region separates Georgia from its two occupied territories. The process of so called "borderization" was commenced in 2011 (April/May). Since February 2013 the Russian occupation forces intensified the process of the installation of razor wire and barbed wire fences, so called "border" signs and other artificial obstacles along the occupation lines in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region. Currently, the total length of razor wire and barbed wire fences and other artificial obstacles along the occupation line in Tskhinvali Region is nearly 52 km (overall length of the occupation line is more than 350 km) and along the occupation line in Abkhazia is 48 km (overall length of the occupation line is around 145 km).

[16] *Abkhazia will not hand over to Georgia border guard suspected in murder*, "Ria Novosti", 6 July 2016, available at <https://ria.ru/world/20160706/1459757274.html>.

14. The international community regularly has been expressing concern regarding the process of installation of razor wire and barbed wire fences, so called "border" signs and other artificial obstacles along the occupation lines and has been stressing the negative impact of this process on human rights of local population. Below there are several examples of such reactions in the reporting period.

15. In its "Resolution on the Conflict in Georgia", the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly deplored "the process of the installation of razor wire fences and embankments by the Russian occupation forces along the occupation line, dividing the local population and depriving them of fundamental rights and freedoms, including, but not limited to, the freedom of movement, family life, right to property, education in their native language, and other civil and economic rights."[17]

16. The Council of Europe, in its 14th Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, covering the period between April 2016 and September 2016 and thus fully covering the reporting period of the present report, stated the following: "[s]erious human rights concerns remain in relation to the conflict divide. The "borderisation process", as well as regular incidence of detentions across the ABL have been repeatedly highlighted as the major negative patterns affecting in turn, but not limited to, the freedom of movement, the right to property and family life, the right to education in native language, as well as social and economic rights of the population on both sides of the ABL."[18]

17. As already mentioned, Mr Chaloka Beyani, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons was not allowed to visit the occupied regions of Georgia, however he visited adjacent areas of the occupation line and stated the following in his written statement: "I regret that the razor wire fence along the administrative boundary line of the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia, continues to have the effect of depriving internally displaced persons and displacement affected communities of freedom of movement and creates tangible obstacles to their access to land, property and livelihoods."[19]

18. During the reporting period, namely on 8th September 2016, the US Congress House of Representatives adopted a resolution in support of territorial integrity of Georgia.[20] According to the adopted resolution, "the Russian Federation is building barbed wire fences and installing, so-called "border signs" and other artificial barriers along the occupation line and depriving the people residing within the occupied regions and in the adjacent areas of their fundamental rights and freedoms,

[17] *Resolution on the Conflict in Georgia*, Twenty-Fifth Annual Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Tbilisi, Georgia, 1-5 July 2016, pages 25-26, paragraph 9, available at <https://www.oscepa.org/documents/all- documents/annual-sessions/2016-tbilisi/declaration-24/3371-tbilisi-declaration-eng/file>.

[18] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (April 2015-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf(2016) 37, paragraph 33.

[19] *United Nations expert calls for transition to needs-based approaches to address the situation of IDPs in Georgia*, Statement from Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Mr. Chaloka Beyani, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 6 October 2016.

[20] *Resolution in support territorial integrity of Georgia, the US Congress House of Representatives, 8 September 2016*, available at <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-resolution/660/text>.

including, but not limited to the freedom of movement, family life, education in their native language, and other civil and economic rights".

New so called "Laws"

19. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia once again expresses its serious concern on the adoption of new discriminatory regulations for ethnic Georgians living in the occupied regions of Georgia. There is threat that this so called "laws" can become ground for another wave of ethnic cleansing.

20. It should be recalled here that on 1st April 2016, so called "law on legal status of foreign citizens in Abkhazia" and "law on entry and exit of Abkhazia" became operational. Similar document was adopted by the Tskhinvali occupation regime, namely so called "law on legal status of foreigners in the Republic of South Ossetia". Adoption of so called "laws" in many ways target the ethnic Georgian population living in the occupied territories.

21. So called "law on legal status of foreign citizens in Abkhazia" aims to qualify ethnic Georgians, living in the region of Abkhazia, into a category of "foreign citizens" and to discriminate against them in many ways. Many ethnic Georgians living in Abkhazia, predominantly in Gali district, hold Georgian citizenship that qualifies them into the category of "foreigners" under the so called "law on legal status of foreign citizens in Abkhazia" and therefore puts limitation on their human rights including on the freedom of movement, the right to property and labour rights. Under this so called "law" ethnic Georgians holding Georgian citizenship are deprived possibility to obtain residence permits and respective restrictive clauses prepare "legal" ground for persecution of ethnic Georgian families. According to the Council of Europe, "the application of the *de facto* law in Gali appears to have been put on hold. While this could be an indication that *de facto* authorities recognise that the *de facto* law is problematic and cannot be implemented in its current form, the delegation was informed that several consecutive motions to introduce amendments have been rejected at the level of the *de facto* parliamentary committee."[21]

22. By the adoption of so called "law on entry and exit of Abkhazia", the decision has been made to introduce visas for states a) not recognizing so called "independence of Abkhazia" and b) not having a "bilateral agreement" of visa free travel. Under this so called "law" any person can exit Abkhazia, however only so called "citizens of Abkhazia" can enter Abkhazia without additional formalities. It should be noted that a foreign citizen or a person without citizenship can be expelled from the territory of occupied Abkhazia if that person poses a threat to defense and security or to public order. It should be emphasized that this so called "law", creates additional obstacles to representatives of international organizations leading to further isolation of the region. According to the Council of Europe, "there is also a shared perception that the operational environment has become more challenging, partially in connection to the application of new procedures and rules on access; the delegation was informed that, during the reporting period, staff of international organisations had experienced restrictions when traveling to Abkhazia and that on several occasions had been interviewed by the members of the local

[21] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (April 2015-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf(2016) 37, paragraph 46.

security services. Georgian staff from international organisations and NGOs are prevented from entering Abkhazia."[22] It has been further argued by the Council of Europe that "[a]mbiguity surrounds the application of the new *de facto* law on procedures of entry into and exit from Abkhazia, which requires, *inter alia*, that citizens of all countries that have not signed "a visa-free agreement" with Abkhazia to obtain an "entry visa". The delegation learnt about instances when these reciprocity provisions were apparently tested in practice resulting in further complications of the crossing regime."[23]

New Wave of so called "Passportisation"

23. The adoption of the above-mentioned so called "laws" by the occupation regimes of Sokhumi and Tskhinvali is directly linked to the new illegal wave of "passportization" in the occupied territories.

24. It should be recalled here that the process of so called "passportisation" in the occupied Abkhazia implies procession and distribution of 300 thousand new documents — 250 thousand so called "passports" and 50 thousand so called "residence permits". All 300 000 documents were already processed in the Russian Federation by "Goznak" and their distribution was postponed several times.

25. The purpose of so called "passportisation" in the occupied Abkhazia is to classify the population into categories of "citizens of Abkhazia" and "foreign citizens". Those residents of Abkhazia that are not citizens of Georgia, will be eligible to obtain so called "Abkhazian passports". It should be recalled here that in 2014, so called "parliament" of the Sokhumi occupation regime adopted so called "decree" by which it annulled so called "Abkhaz passports" of around 25 000 ethnic Georgians living in Abkhazia, predominantly in Gali district.[24] Nowadays it has become evident that so called "Abkhaz passports" of 25 000 ethnic Georgians were cancelled in order to give to ethnic Georgians the status of "foreign citizens" that implies lots of restrictions on their human rights. On 16th September 2016, so called "minister of interior" of the Sokhumi occupation regime declared that it was a right decision in 2014 to invalidate so called "Abkhaz passports" of 26 000 ethnic Georgians.[25] According to the Council of Europe, "the situation with the identity and residence documents of the ethnic Georgian population living in Gali (and to a lesser extent in Ochamchira and Tkvarcheli) continues to be marked by lack of clarity. It is recalled that the large majority of the local population lacks valid identity documents following the invalidation of their Abkhaz *de facto* passports, many of which were subsequently withdrawn."[26] According to the information

[22] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (April 2015-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf(2016) 37, paragraph 27.

[23] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (April 2015-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf(2016) 37, paragraph 43.

[24] *The Realm of the Possible - Finding ways forward in the Georgian-Abkhaz context: People in the Gal/i region*, Conciliation Resources, July 2015, pages 4 and 5, available at <http://www.c-r.org/downloads/CR_The-Realm-of- the-possible_Gal-i_43_webEn.pdf>.

[25] *Aslan Kobakhia: Change of passports is under a strict control*, "Abkhazinform", 16 September 2016, available at <http://abkhazinform.com/item/4576-aslan-kobakhiya-obmen-pasportov-postavlen-pod-zhestkij-kontrol>.

[26] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (April 2015-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf(2016) 37, paragraph 45.

disseminated on 12th July 2016, so called "Prosecutor's Office" of the Sokhumi occupation regime completed investigation against former so called "Head of Gali District" and filed "criminal charges" (consisting of 150 volumes) against him in so called "court".[27] According to "Prosecutor's Office" of the Sokhumi occupation regime, between the years 2007 and 2014, former so called "Head of Gali District", improperly issued so called "Abkhaz passports" to 14 988 residents of Gali district which were holders of the Georgian citizenship.[28]

26. So called "minister of interior" of the Sokhumi occupation regime declared that distribution of so called "Abkhaz passports" will be under strict control in order to avoid the situation which was in the past.[29] It should be noted that the distribution of so called "Abkhaz passports" and so called "residence permits" did not start in Gali district.[30] It has been argued that 96 per cent of Gali district population has the Georgian citizenship.[31]

27. It should be emphasized that as part of so called "passportisation", by 16th September 2016 only 330 residents of the occupied Abkhazia received new so called "Abkhazian passports".[32] According to so called "minister of interior" of the Sokhumi occupation regime, it is planned to complete the process of so called "passportisation" in eastern part by March 2017; there is no need to complete the whole process of so called "passportisation" by March 2017.[33]

28. Since the partial completion of distribution of so called "Abkhazian passports" is planned by March 2017, the real impact of so called "passportisation" on ethnic Georgians residing in the occupied Abkhazia will start to become obvious from the above date. On the other hand, the completion of the process of so called "passportisation" is undoubtedly a precondition for the factual realization of the adopted so called "laws" on legal status of foreigners and on entry and exit. Undoubtedly, this so called "passportisation" in the occupied Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region may result in a situation where individuals, not eligible to so called

---

[27] *Passport case against former head of Gali district was in sent to court*. "Apsnypress", 12 July 2016, available at <http://www.apsnypress.info/news/pasportnoe-delo-v-otnoshenii-eks-glavy-galskogo-rayona-napravleno-v-sud/>.

[28] *Passport case against former head of Gali district was in sent to court*. "Apsnypress", 12 July 2016, available at <http://www.apsnypress.info/news/pasportnoe-delo-v-otnoshenii-eks-glavy-galskogo-rayona-napravleno-v-sud/>.

[29] *Aslan Kobakhia: Change of passports is under a strict control*, "Abkhazinform", 16 September 2016, available at <http://abkhazinform.com/item/4576-aslan-kobakhiya-obmen-pasportov-postavlen-pod-zhestkij-kontrol>.

[30] *Timur Nadaraia: "our aim is to strengthen the district and increase the budget of the state"*, "aiaaira.com", 19 July 2016, available at <http://aiaaira.com/news/intervyu/timur_nadaraya_nasha_zadacha_ukreplyat_rayon_i_uvelichivat_byudzhet_gosud arstva/>.

[31] *Timur Nadaraia: "our aim is to strengthen the district and increase the budget of the state"*, "aiaaira.com", 19 July 2016, available at <http://aiaaira.com/news/intervyu/timur_nadaraya_nasha_zadacha_ukreplyat_rayon_i_uvelichivat_byudzhet_gosud arstva/>.

[32] *Dzapsha: New Abkhazian Passports will be Distributed from 10th July*, "Apsny", 20 June 2016, available at <http://apsny.ru/news/?ID=22876>; As for occupied Tskhinvali region, in June 2015, the Tskhinvali occupation regime began accepting applications for so called "South Ossetian passports," which required individuals renounce their Georgian citizenship.

[33] *Minister of Interior: 330 new Abkhaz passports already distributed*, "Apsnypress", 16 September 2016, available at <http://www.apsnypress.info/news/ministr-vd-330-novykh-abkhazskikh-pasportov-uzhe-vydano/>.

new "passports" or so called new "residence permits", face more complications regarding the right to property and the freedom of movement across the occupation line. Ethnic Georgians residing in the occupied region of Abkhazia have all grounds to be concerned about such perspective; status of a "foreigner" can at least restrict their right to property and deteriorate prospects of movement across the occupation line and, in the worst case, become ground for another wave of ethnic cleansing.

29. According to the Council of Europe, "it is evident that the documentation gap is widening and the local population is becoming increasingly wary of the perpetuation of the legal status limbo. Pending a viable solution, international humanitarian actors have called upon the *de facto* authorities to urgently undertake outreach efforts and offer assurances, in order to counter any perception of uncertainty and ethnic based discrimination that in turn risk prompting new displacement."[34]

II. Freedom from Torture and Ill-treatment

30. The practice of torture and ill-treatment in the occupied regions of Georgia remained an issue of concern during the reporting period. According to the Council of Europe, in the Abkhazian region, "[a]gainst the background of ongoing "borderisation", very serious concerns persist with respect to freedom of movement. Detentions for "illegal border crossing" or "violation of the border zone regime" continue to occur. According to the delegation's interlocutors, some 30 detentions are registered per month, although it is recognised that not all cases are reported. In this respect, the Office of the Public Defender of Georgia raised strong concerns about allegations that in some cases, those detained were subjected to physical abuse and even forced labour, deepening the sense of insecurity."[35] It has been further argued by the Council of Europe that in Tskhinvali Region "allegations of physical abuse during apprehension have been reported in some of the cases."[36] Below are only few examples.

31. On 26th July 2016, in the vicinity of the village of Kirbali, Gori district, nearby of the occupation line with Tskhinvali region, the Russian FSB officers while attempting to illegally detain a local resident physically assaulted him. The beaten local resident was later transported by ambulance to the hospital in the town of Gori, the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia.[37]

---

[34] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (April 2015-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf(2016) 37, paragraph 48.

[35] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (April 2015-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf(2016) 37, paragraph 42.

[36] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (April 2015-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf(2016) 37, paragraph 57.

[37] *Urgent: Russian occupants have beaten a man in Gori district*, "Newpost.ge", 26 July 2016, available at <http://www.newposts.ge/?l=G&id=115041-%E1%83%9D%E1%83%99%E1%83%A3%E1%83%9E%E1%83%90%E1%83%9C%E1%83%97%E1%83%94%-E1%83%91%E1%83%98%2C+%E1%83%9B%E1%83%90%E1%83%9B%E1%83%90%E1%83%99%E1%83%90%E1%83%AA%E1%83%98%2C+%E1%83%AA%E1%83%94%E1%83%9B%E1%83%90>; *Representatives of occupying forces tried to abduct a resident of the village of Kirbali*, "Interpressnews", 27 July 2016, available at <http://www.interpressnews.ge/ge/konfliqtebi/390227-saokupacio-dzalebis-tsarmomadgenlebma-sofel-kirbalis- mkvidris-gataceba-scades.html?ar=A>.

32. On 5th August 2016, after three days in detention in so called "detention centre of Tskhinvali", illegally detained resident of the village of Kveshi, Gori district was released. The released man was immediately transported to a hospital in the town of Gori due to severe physical assault he was subject in the process of detention by the Russian FSB officers. According to the doctor of the Gori hospital, health condition of the patient from the village of Kveshi was grave when received for treatment due to brain concussion and bruises in different areas of the body. According to the victim, he was nearby his house, namely he was working in his orchard on the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia when six armed men came to him and tried to detain him. He did not obey to the orders of the Russian FSB officers that resulted in severe beating of him and in his abduction to the direction of the occupied Tskhinvali region.[38]

III. Arbitrary Detention

33. The Russian FSB officers regularly carry out arbitrary detention for so called "illegal border crossing" along the occupation lines with Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions.

34. According to the Council of Europe, for example, in the Tskhinvali Region "detentions for "violation of the state border" occur on a regular basis, mostly due to local residents crossing the ABL, intentionally or inadvertently to chase stray cattle, access livelihoods or visit the area, including for participating in religious and funeral services. Detention numbers remain at the same level: according to the Georgian Security Service, as of mid-September, 109 people have been detained since the start of the year. Allegations of physical abuse during apprehension have been reported in some of the cases. While in most instances those detained are released after paying a "fine" the Georgian authorities brought to the attention of the delegation the case of a Georgian national who was arrested for "illegal border crossing" in June, and latter remanded to pre-trial detention in Tskhinvali on new charges apparently in connection to the August 2008 conflict."[39] To be more precise with regard to the last sentence of the above observation, on 8 June 2016, Mr. Giorgi Giunashvil, citizen of Georgia was detained by the Russian FSB officers for so called "illegal border crossing" along the occupation line with Tskhinvali region. Initially, the detainee was sentenced two months of imprisonment for so called "illegal border crossing". Later, namely during the reporting period, so called "Prosecutor's Office" of the Tskhinvali occupation regime initiated "criminal case" against Mr. Giorgi Giunashvil accusing him of "causing serious damage to the

[38] *Released detainee from the Tskhinvali detention centre is beaten*, "Interpressnews", 7 August 2016, available at <http://www.interpressnews.ge/ge/konfliqtebi/391659-ckhinvalis-izolatoridan-gathavisuflebuli-aleqsandre-sheverdashvili-nacemia.html?ar=A>; Georgian citizen released from the Tskhinvali detention centre is beaten, "GHN", 7 August 2016, available at <http://ghn.ge/com/news/view/157519>.

[39] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (April 2015-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf(2016) 37, paragraphs 57-58.

health" of an unspecified resident of the Tskhinavli region in the year 2008.[40] The central government of Georgia consider the above accusations against Mr. Giorgi Giunashvil to be forged and absolutely ungrounded.[41] It is alarming that Mr. Giorgi Giunashvil remained in illegal detention throughout the reporting period.

35. During the reporting period numerous cases were reported on arbitrary detention in the occupied regions of Georgia. Below are only few examples.

36. On 13 August 2016, the Russian FSB officers crossed the occupation line with Abkhazia and detained two citizens of Georgia in the village of Rukhi. Both detainees were abducted to so called "Gali detention centre" on the territory of the occupied Abkhazia. Two citizens of Georgia did not cross the occupation line, but they were swimming in the river when they were illegally detained. The Russian FSB officers even fired a warning shot in the air in order to carry out detention.[42]

37. On 4th September 2016, a resident of the village of Zardiantkari, Gori district, was detained by the Russian FSB officers for so called "illegal border crossing" along the occupation line with Tskhinvali region. The villager crossed the occupation line in order to attend funeral ceremony in the village of Khelchuashi in the occupied Tskhinvali region. The detainee was transported to so called "detention centre of Tskhinvali".[43]

38. On 11th September 2016, a resident of the village of Koshka, Gori district, was detained by the Russian FSB officers for so called "illegal border crossing". The resident of the village of Koshka was nearby the village for cattle grazing, however he did not cross the occupation line. The Russian FSB officers entered into

---

[40] *IPRM Meeting held in Ergneti*, State Security Service of Georgia, 19 July 2016, available at <http://ssg.gov.ge/en/news/152/IPRM-Meeting-Held-in-Ergneti>; *10 issues discussed in the framework of Incident Prevention and Reaction Mechanism (IPRM)*, "Kvira.ge", 19 July 2016, available at <http://kvira.ge/%E1%83%98%E1%83%9C%E1%83%AA%E1%83%98%E1%83%93%E1%83%94%E1%83%9C%E1%83%A2%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1-%E1%83%9E%E1%83%A0%E1%83%94%E1%83%95%E1%83%94%E1%83%9C%E1%83%AA%E1%83%98%E1%83%98-4/>.

[41] *10 issues discussed in the framework of Incident Prevention and Reaction Mechanism (IPRM)*, "Kvira.ge", 19 July 2016, available at <http://kvira.ge/%E1%83%98%E1%83%9C%E1%83%AA%E1%83%98%E1%83%93%E1%83%94%E1%83%9C%E1%83%A2%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1-%E1%83%9E%E1%83%A0%E1%83%94%E1%83%95%E1%83%94%E1%83%9C%E1%83%AA%E1%83%98%E1%83%98-4/>.

[42] *Urgent: Occupants abducted 2 citizens of Georgia from the village of Rukhi*, "Newpost.ge", 13 August 2016, available at <http://www.newposts.ge/?l=G&id=116398-%E1%83%92%E1%83%90%20%E1%83%A2%E1%83%90%E1%83%AA%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%90,%20%E1%83%A0%E1%83%A3%E1%83%AE%E1%83%98>.

[43] *Representatives of the occupation regime detained man in the village of Khelchuashi during the funeral ceremony*, "Newpost.ge", 9 September 2016, available at <http://www.newposts.ge/?l=G&id=118016-%E1%83%A1%E1%83%90%E1%83%9D%E1%83%99%E1%83%A3%E1%83%9E%E1%83%90%E1%83%AA%E1%83%98%E1%83%9D,%20%E1%83%A0%E1%83%94%E1%83%9F%E1%83%98%E1%83%9B%E1%83%98,%20%E1%83%93%E1%83%90%E1%83%90%E1%83%99%E1%83%90%E1%83%95%E1%83%94%E1>.

the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia and abducted him to the occupied Tskhivali region.[44]

39. On 12th September 2016, three residents of Khashuri were detained by the Russian FSB officers for so called "illegal border crossing". These three people were in Tcheratkhevi gorge forest when they were detained by the Russian FSB officers, thus they did not cross the occupation line. All three people were abducted to the occupied Tskhinvali region.[45]

40. On 16th September 2016, a 17-year-old resident of the village of Upper Sobisi, Gori district was detained in the village of Bershueti, Gori district by the Russian FSB officers for so called "illegal border crossing". The resident of the village of Upper Sobisi, Gori district did not cross the occupation line with Tskhinvali region; he was visiting church in the village of Bershueti when he was detained and abducted to the occupied Tskhinvali region.[46]

IV. Freedom of Movement

41. Restrictions on freedom of movement remains an issue of concern that has been attested by the various sources made available in the reporting period.

42. Mr Chaloka Beyani, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons stated the following in his written statement: "I regret that the razor wire fence along the administrative boundary line of the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia, continues to have the effect of depriving internally displaced persons and displacement affected communities of freedom of movement ...."[47] In the same written statement we read that Mr Chaloka Beyani met with IDPs returned at Khurcha and Inguri crossing points and that they shared "their experience and most pressing concerns, including the lack of access to documentation affecting many, which has an extremely negative impact on their freedom of movement ...".[48] According to Special Rapporteur, in the Abkhazian region "other major concerns he highlighted related to detention for "illegal"

[44] *Russian occupants abducted a resident of the village of Koshka, Gori district*, "Newpost.ge", 11 September 2016, available at <http://www.newposts.ge/?l=G&id=118753-%E1%83%9D%E1%83%99%E1%83%A3%E1%83%9E%E1%83%90%E1%83%9C%E1%83%A2%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98,%20%E1%83%92%E1%83%90%E1%83%A2%E1%83%90%E1%83%AA%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%90,%20%E1%83%A0%E1%83%A3%E1%83%A1%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98>.

[45] *Another abduction from the Georgian controlled territory: 3 Georgians are in captivity of occupants*, "Newpost.ge", 12 September 2016, available at <http://www.newposts.ge/?l=G&id=118814>.

[46] *A minor person was abducted from Gori district*, "Newpost.ge", 16 September 2016, available at <http://www.newposts.ge/?l=G&id=119365>.

[47] *United Nations expert calls for transition to needs-based approaches to address the situation of IDPs in Georgia*, Statement from Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Mr. Chaloka Beyani, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 6 October 2016.

[48] *United Nations expert calls for transition to needs-based approaches to address the situation of IDPs in Georgia*, Statement from Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Mr. Chaloka Beyani, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 6 October 2016.

crossings of the dividing line, the closure of two crossing points over the past few months the risk that more will be closed in the near future."[49]

43. According to the Council of Europe, in the Abkhazian region "as of May [2016], two crossing points in Lekukhona and Tagiloni were closed down. Currently four crossing points continue to function. However, the *de facto* authorities appear intent on closing down two of them, once the relevant infrastructure has been rehabilitated."[50] It has been argued that in the Abkhazian region "the "borderisation" process and the related constraints of freedom of movement exacerbate the conflict divide, contribute to isolation of communities and affect in multiple negative ways the human rights of the local population, in particular in Gali. The process has continued to draw strong criticism from the Georgian government as well as various international bodies and governments. International humanitarian actors have continued to advise strongly against such restrictions, including the closure of additional crossing points."[51]

44. It should be noted that during the reporting period Mr. Khajimba declared that only one crossing point will remain over the River Enguri, all others will be closed down.[52] According to residents of adjacent territories to Zugdidi and Gali districts, control imposed on their movement is already tightened due to the activities of the Russian FSB officers: "what to do? how to live when we even cannot move normally? Where to get food products?" — these are question posed by them.[53]

45. It should be emphasized that on 4th July 2016, Mr. Tibilov publicly declared that so called "border" with Georgia in the future would be even more tightened with the assistance of the Russian Federation.[54] According to the Council of Europe, "as reported to the delegation, as of next year, the *de facto* authorities plan to start issuing new registration/crossing permissions (*propusks*) for the ethnic Georgian

---

[49] *United Nations expert calls for transition to needs-based approaches to address the situation of IDPs in Georgia*, Statement from Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Mr. Chaloka Beyani. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 6 October 2016.

[50] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (April 2015-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf(2016) 37, paragraph 41.

[51] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (April 2015-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf(2016) 37, paragraph 44.

[52] *Khajimba has confirmed: the Abkhaz side will keep only one crossing point over Enguri*, "Accent com", 6 July2016, available at <http://accent.com.ge/ge/news/details/18400-%E1%83%AE%E1%83%90%E1%83%AF%E1%83%98%E1%83%9B%E1%83%91%E1%83%90%E1%83%9B-%E1%83%93%E1%83%90%E1%83%90%E1%83%93%E1%83%90%E1%83%A1%E1%83%A2%E1%83%A3%E1%83%A0%E1%83%90-%E1%83%90%E1%83%A4%E1%83%AE%E1%83%90%E1%83%96%E1%>.

[53] *Khajimba has confirmed: the Abkhaz side will keep only one crossing point over Enguri*, "Accent.com", 6 July 2016, available at <http://accent.com.ge/ge/news/details/18400-%E1%83%AE%E1%83%90%E1%83%AF%E1%83%98%E1%83%9B%E1%83%91%E1%83%90%E1%83%9B-%E1%83%93%E1%83%90%E1%83%90%E1%83%93%E1%83%90%E1%83%A1%E1%83%A2%E1%83%A3% E1%83%A0%E1%83%90-%E1%83%90%E1%83%A4%E1%83%AE%E1%83%90%E1%83%96%E1%>.

[54] *Tibilov plans to more seriously tighten so called border with Georgia*, "Kvira.ge", 4 July 2016, available at <http://kvira.ge/%E1%83%97%E1%83%98%E1%83%91%E1%83%98%E1%83%9A%E1%83%9D%E1%83%95%E1%83%98-%E1%83%A1%E1%83%90%E1%83%A5%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%97%E1%83%95%E1%83%94%E1%83%9A%E1%83%9D%E1%83%A1%E1%83%97%E1%83%90-2/>.

residents of Akhalgori, the majority of whom have an IDP status and reside in territory controlled by the Georgian central government. The measure is reportedly related to the expiration of previously issued documents, even though it seems that *de facto* authorities continue to allow their use. In this respect, some humanitarian actors expressed caution about the fact that the number of those who receive documentation tends to decrease with each new turn. It is estimated that lack of regular documentation hampers the free movement of some 5000 persons from the Akhalgori district."[55]

46. According to the information disseminated on 15th July 2016, residents of so called "border zone" villages of Znauri district located in the territory of the occupied Tskhinvali region, wrote letters to so called "president", "parliament" and "government" of the Tskhinvali occupation regime and demanded removal of checkpoints from their villages. According to the demands of the local residents, existing checkpoints violate their freedom of movement. They argue that these checkpoints and regular control hinder free movement of local residents across their villages which are located around six kilometers away from the occupation line. Local residents complain that the daily life and communication is hard in so called "border zones" located nearby the occupation line.[56] It should be noted that in 2012 decision was made in the occupied Tskhinvali region to introduce "border zone" in the adjacent areas of the occupation line. So called "border zone" implies particular restrictions of freedom of movement and there is a need to have special "permit" issued by so called "Border Security Service of South Ossetia" in order to enter this "border zone".[57]

V. Right to Property

47. During the reporting period, violations of the right to property in the occupied regions of Georgia remained the issue of concern for the international community. It should be emphasized that in "Resolution on the Conflict in Georgia", the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly expressed "concern about the humanitarian situation of the internally displaced persons and refugees, continuously being deprived of the right to voluntary, safe, dignified, and unhindered return to their places of origin, as well as the right to property".[58] Mr Chaloka Beyani, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons stated the following in his written statement: "I regret that the razor wire fence along the administrative boundary line

[55] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (April 2015-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf(2016) 37, paragraph 59.

[56] *This is not nice and very humiliating*, "Okhokavkaza", 15 July 2016, available at <http://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/27860884.html>.

[57] *Security Council of South Ossetia will consider issues related to visiting border zone*, "Sputnik-Ossetia", 2 August 2016, available at <http://sputnik-ossetia.ru/South_Ossetia/20160802/2823901.html>.

[58] *Resolution on the Conflict in Georgia*, Twenty-Fifth Annual Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 1-5 July 2016, pages 25-26, paragraph 8, available at <https://www.oscepa.org/documents/all-documents/annual-sessions/2016-tbilisi/declaration-24/3371-tbilisi-declaration-eng/file>.

of the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia, ... creates tangible obstacles to their access to land, property and livelihoods".[59]

48. According to the Council of Europe, its "delegation received information about new "borderisation" activities along the ABL with South Ossetia. While ABL fencing has been ceased, the installation of "border signposts" (some 200 so far) seem increasingly problematic. Their appearance at several locations during the period under review continued to lead to effective loss of access to property and livelihood as well as detention of the local population. The delegation's attention was drawn to a case from August 2016 where tensions heightened after Georgian farmers were not allowed to harvest their crops and due to the installation of a new signpost in the Gduleti area."[60]

49. On 23rd August 2016, the Russian FSB officers, deployed in the Tskhinvali region, entered the vicinity of the village of Sobisi, Gori district and by using combine harvester started to harvest barley in the land property of two local residents. In the morning of 24th August 2016, local landowners discovered that barley harvesting was ongoing and barley from around 2 hectares of their land property had been already harvested. The Russian FSB officers declared to local landowners that their agricultural plots of land were not on "the territory of Georgia". According to one of the landowners, his family owns the plot of land for years and it is located on the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia. According to him, he was cultivating his plot of land throughout the year and had spent significant amount of money in order to gain barley harvest of around 20 tones and now he is banned by the Russian FSB officers to enter his land property. The landowner recalled that last year the Russian FSB officers had approached him and had told that part of his agricultural land property, namely around 6 hectares was not on "the territory of Georgia". It should be noted that on 24th August 2016, as a result of a reaction from the central government of Georgia, combine harvester ceased harvesting barley and, on 25th August 2016, local residents were given only 5 hours by the Russian FSB officers in order to harvest remaining barley from their land, however this move did not solve the issue of ownership of their land property.[61]

---

[59] *United Nations expert calls for transition to needs-based approaches to address the situation of IDPs in Georgia*, Statement from Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Mr. Chaloka Beyani. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 6 October 2016.

[60] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (April 2015-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf(2016) 37, paragraph 54.

[61] *Occupants harvesting barley of locals in the village of Sobisi, Gori district*, "Interpressnews", 24 August 2016, available at <http://www.interpressnews.ge/ge/konfliqtebi/393718-goris-raionis-sofel-sobisshi-adgilobrivis-qeris-mosavals-okupantebi-igheben.html?ar=A>; Russian occupants took away another 6 hectares of land from Georgia, "Newpost.ge", 24 August 2016, available at <http://www.newposts.ge/?l=G&id=117025-%E1%83%92%E1%83%9D%E1%83%A0%E1%83%98,%20%E1%83%9D%E1%83%99%E1%83%A3%E1%83%9E%E1%83%90%E1%8>; *Russian combine harvester harvested crops of residents of adjacent areas of the occupation line*, "Tabula", 24 August 2016, available at <http://www.tabula.ge/ge/story/111093-rusulma-kombainma-saokupacio-xaztan-macxovrebelta-mosavali-aigho>; Russian occupants are robbing Georgian peasants, "Tbilisi media", 27 August 2016, available at <https://tbilisi.media/main/56266-rossijskie-okkupanty-obvorovyvayut-gruzinskih-krestyan/>; *In the village of Sobisi, family of Chilindarashvilis was given 5 hours in order to harvest barley*, "Interpressnews", 25 August 2016, available at <http://www.interpressnews.ge/ge/konfliqtebi/393921-sofel-sobisshi-chilindrishvilebis-ojakhs-qeris-mosavlis-dasabinaveblad-5-saathi-mieca.html?ar=A>.

VI. Right to Education in the Native Language

50. It should be recalled here that in the Gali district there are 31 schools.[62] From 31 schools only 11 schools, all of which are in "lower zone" of Gali district, had the status of Georgian schools until the end of the academic year 2014-2015 and subjects were taught in the Georgian language.[63] However, from the beginning of September of the academic year 2015-2016, drastic changes were made in the curriculum of these 11 schools in "lower zone" of Gali district, implying teaching of all subjects in the Russian language in the first four grade classes i.e. in first grade, second grade, third grade and fourth grade classes.[64]

51. It should be emphasized that the academic year 2016-2017 started in line with the above changes implying teaching of all subjects in the Russian language. The above policy, if continued for several years, would result in gradual replacement of the Georgian curriculum with the Russian curriculum for all grades in these 11 schools of "lower zone" of Gali district. It has been argued that teachers of lower classes (from I to V) of 11 schools, all of which had the status of Georgian schools, are obliged to attend special trainings on using the Russian language as the language of instruction.[65] According to the Council of Europe, "[d]uring the period under review, the situation with education in the Georgian language in Abkhazia continued to receive sustained attention. The delegation was informed that, since the start of the new school year, the Russian language had become the formal instruction language also in grade V in addition to grades I to IV. This policy seems to be applied in all 11 schools in the Gali district. In these schools, Georgian language is limited to three lessons per week along with two lessons of Georgian literature."[66] It has been further argued by the Council of Europe that "restrictions of freedom of

---

[62] By the end of the academic year 2014-2015 there were 4,459 pupils and 918 employees in these 31 schools; from 4,459 pupils, 97.57 per cent. were ethnically Georgian and from 918 employees, 91.78 per cent were ethnically Georgian. See *Weekly press review on the human rights violations and current events in Abkhazia*, prepared by the Justice Department of Georgia's Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, between 27 July and 2 August 2015.

[63] *The Realm of the Possible — Finding ways forward in the Georgian-Abkhaz context: People in the Gal/I region*, Conciliation Resources, July 2015, page 10, available at <http://www.c-r.org/downloads/CR_The-Realm-of-the-possible_Gal-i_43_webEn.pdf>; *Report of the Year 2014 of the Public Defender of Georgia on the Situation of Rights of the Population Affected by the Conflicts*, 5 June 2015, page 26, available at <http://www.ombudsman.ge/en/news/reports-on-the-human-rights-situation-of-conflict-affected-population-and- internally-displaced-persons-in-georgia.page>.

[64] The Russian curriculum means that the Russian textbooks, licensed by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation and published in the Russian Federation, are used for the teaching. *A special Report of the Public Defender of Georgia - The Right to Education in Gali District: New Developments and Challenges of the Academic Year of 2015-2016*, "Public Defender of Georgia", October 2015, page 4 and 5, available at <https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B9BM3M8hbgAUNFE3RndlaXc2dFU/view?pref=2&pli=1>; In these classes only few hours is allocated for learning the Georgian language as a foreign language.

[65] *Timur Nadaraia: "our aim is to strengthen the district and increase the budget of the state"*, "aiaaira.com", 19 July 2016, available at <http://aiaaira.com/news/intervyu/timur_nadaraya_nasha_zadacha_ukreplyat_rayon_i_uvelichivat_byudzhet_gosud arstva/>.

[66] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (April 2015-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf(2016) 37, paragraph 49.

movement continue to have a negative impact on access to education for children who attend school on the other side of the ABL."[67]

52. According Mr Chaloka Beyani, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, "other major concerns he highlighted related to ... the progressive change of language of instruction in Lower and Upper Gali Schools from Georgian to Russian."[68]

VII. Conclusions

53. It can be concluded that the situation described in the occupied regions of Georgia with regard to freedom of torture and ill treatment and examples provided for the reporting period constitute infringements on freedom from torture and ill-treatment and therefore are violations of Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); and the OSCE commitments.[69]

54. It can be concluded that the situation described in the occupied regions of Georgia with regard to arbitrary detention and examples provided for the reporting period constitute arbitrary detention and therefore violations of Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); and relevant provisions of the OSCE commitments.

55. It can be concluded that the situation described in the occupied regions of Georgia with regard to freedom of movement and examples provided for the reporting period constitute violations of the right to freedom of movement, namely of Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Article 2, Protocol No. 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); and the OSCE freedom of movement commitments.

56. It can be concluded that the situation described in the occupied regions of Georgia with regard to the right to property and examples provided for the reporting period violate the right to property, namely Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Article 1, Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); and the OSCE commitments.

---

[67] Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of Europe (April 2015-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf(2016) 37, paragraph 52.

[68] *United Nations expert calls for transition to needs-based approaches to address the situation of IDPs in Georgia*, Statement from Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Mr. Chaloka Beyani. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 6 October 2016.

[69] The Vienna Concluding Document (1989) prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Paragraph 23.4; The Paris Document (1990) also prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the Istanbul Charter for European Security commits to "eradicating torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the OSCE area." Paragraph 21.

57. It can be concluded that the situation described in the occupied regions of Georgia with regard to education in the native language and examples provided for the reporting period constitute violations of the right to education in one's native language and therefore violations of Article 26 (read in conjunction with Article 2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Article 2, Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); Article 28 (read in conjunction with paragraph 1 of Article 2) of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child; and relevant provisions of the OSCE commitments.

58. It can be concluded that the situation described in the occupied regions of Georgia, particularly adoption of so called "laws" and the process of "passportisation" violates prohibition of discrimination provisions of Article 14 and Protocol No. 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

59. It can be further concluded that the situation described in the occupied regions of Georgia violates the right of return of all internally displaced persons and refugees and their descendants, regardless of ethnicity, to their homes throughout Georgia, including in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region.[70]

VIII. Appeal to the International Community

60. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia appeals to the international community, states as well as international intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations:

to continue recognizing extensively and widely the occupation of the territories of Georgia by the Russian Federation;

to continue calling on the Russian Federation to bear responsibility for human rights violations on the occupied regions of Georgia;

to continue calling on the Russian Federation to stop placing and removing barbed wire fences and other artificial obstacles and banners along the occupation line;

to take additional measures in order to monitor and report on the human rights situation in the occupied regions of Georgia, more specifically, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia appeals to:

i) the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to take additional measures in order to regularly address and assess the human rights situation in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region of Georgia;

[70] *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 10 June 2016 on Status of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia*, A/RES/70/265. See also previous resolutions: 69/286 of 3 June 2015; 68/274 of 5 June 2014; 67/268 of 13 June 2013; 66/283 of 3 July 2012; 65/287 of 29 June 2011 etc.

ii) the UN Human Rights Council's Special Procedure Mandate holders to take additional measures in order to address and report on the human rights situation in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region of Georgia;

iii) the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe to take additional measures in order to address and report on the human rights situation in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region of Georgia;

iv) the OSCE and its autonomous institutions, namely the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) to find ways for monitoring the human rights situation in Georgia's occupied regions. Such steps could, inter alia, include undertaking a follow-up mission to the occupied regions of Georgia and preparing a report on the status of the implementation of the recommendations contained in the ODIHR/HCNM 2008 Report on "Human Rights in the War Affected Areas following the Conflict in Georgia".

to continue calling on the Russian Federation to allow a) access of the international human rights monitoring mechanisms to the occupied regions of Georgia; b) access of the relevant missions of international organizations (e.g. EUMM), including humanitarian organizations, to the occupied regions of Georgia through legal routes;

to continue and intensify condemning violations of human rights such as the right to life; freedom of movement; freedom from torture and ill-treatment; the right to liberty; the right to property and the right to receive education in the native language in the occupied regions of Georgia.

United Nations S/2016/995

Security Council

Distr.: General
23 November 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 23 November 2016 from the Vice-Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am writing to you in my capacity as Vice-Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission.

I visited Liberia from 19 to 21 October 2016 to consult a wide range of stakeholders in the country in order to identify peacebuilding priorities for the upcoming transition during the drawdown of the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the 2017 elections and beyond. I also co-hosted, with the Government of Liberia, the multi-stakeholder forum on sustaining peace through transition in Liberia. The forum, which was held in Monrovia on 20 October, sought to deliberate on the longer-term peacebuilding needs in the light of the upcoming decision of the Security Council on the future United Nations presence in the country.

The attached reports* provide a summary of the meetings I held during my visit, the outcome of the multi-stakeholder forum and the observations and recommendations I have made in my capacity as Vice-Chair, which are being discussed by the Peacebuilding Commission.

I kindly request that the present letter be circulated to the members of the Security Council and be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Olof **Skoog**
Vice-Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission

* The reports were made available to the members of the Security Council only.

16-20809 (E) 291116

Please recycle

United Nations S/2016/996

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 November 2016

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the request contained in the statement of the President of the Security Council dated 11 June 2015 (S/PRST/2015/12), in which the Council requested me to keep it informed of the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA). It provides an assessment of the major political and security trends in the Central African subregion since my previous report, dated 25 May 2016 (S/2016/482) and provides an update on progress made in the implementation of the mandate of UNOCA and on efforts to implement the United Nations regional strategy to address the threat and impact of the activities of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) (see S/2012/481).

II. Major developments in the Central African subregion

A. Political, peace and security developments and trends

2. The political landscape of the subregion continued to be dominated by preparations for and the conducting and aftermath of electoral processes, a number of which were marked by serious tensions and violence both before and after the electoral processes were conducted.

3. The fight against Boko Haram, including in the context of the Multinational Joint Task Force, continued during the reporting period. The significant progress achieved by the Joint Task Force notwithstanding, the Boko Haram crisis continued in the Lake Chad basin. In parallel, national, regional and international efforts to combat LRA continued, against a backdrop of the planned withdrawal of Ugandan forces from the African Union Regional Task Force and its likely impact on the strategy to counter LRA.

4. The challenging economic situation in the subregion, owing to the slump in global oil prices and difficulties in diversifying the economy and achieving progress in economic integration, continued to contribute to political and social tensions.

16-19581 (E) 291116

Please recycle

5. The summit of Heads of State of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community was held in Malabo on 30 July, under the chairmanship of Equatorial Guinea. The summit discussed an economic partnership agreement with the European Union and the economic and security situation in the subregion. The Heads of State decided to make available 4 billion CFA francs (approximately $6.8 million) to the Central African Republic for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programming. The establishment of a steering committee and an office of the president dedicated to economic and financial reforms within the Central African Economic and Monetary Community were proposed in order to assist the community to address the current economic difficulties.

6. To date, four countries in the subregion have developed national action plans to guide in their implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security, namely, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. Women remain underrepresented in the security sector in Central Africa, with only four countries having more than 20 per cent representation by women in the police force, whereas women's representation in the military averages between 2 and 3 per cent for most Central African countries.

7. On 15 November, the Presidents of Equatorial Guinea and Gabon signed, in my presence, a special agreement to submit the long-standing border dispute between their two countries to the International Court of Justice for a peaceful settlement. The signing ceremony was held in Marrakech, Morocco.

8. During the reporting period, my Special Representative for Central Africa and Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, Abdoulaye Bathily (Senegal), tendered his resignation, citing personal reasons, effective 31 October. I appointed François Louncény Fall (Guinea) as my Acting Special Representative, effective 1 November.

Political developments and trends

9. In Angola, the seventh ordinary congress of the ruling party Movimento Popular de Libertacão de Angola was held in Luanda from 17 to 20 August, at which the President of Angola, José Eduardo dos Santos, was re-elected head of the party. At a central committee meeting of the party held on 23 August, the former Minister of Defence, João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, was chosen as the vice-president of the party, replacing Roberto de Almeida. The voter registration process for the presidential election began on 25 August and will continue through 31 March 2017.

10. In Cameroon, following the changes to the cabinet made in October 2015, plans to hold elections early appear to have been put on hold even after the detention, earlier in 2016, of opposition leaders, party followers and journalists who criticized the proposed constitutional amendments that could have paved the way for holding the presidential election early. The Government is initiating an assessment of recovery and peacebuilding in the Extrême Nord region, with the support of the United Nations, the World Bank and the European Union, in order to adequately respond to the humanitarian, recovery and development aspects of the Boko Haram crisis.

11. The ninth meeting of the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic was held in Bangui on 25 August. Participants included representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States and the Governments of Angola, Chad and the Congo. Among the points discussed at the meeting were the steps taken by the Government of the Central African Republic regarding security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, the announcement that the States members of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community had each agreed to train one battalion of the armed forces of the Central African Republic, the need for dialogue with armed groups and the decision to transform the International Contact Group, co-chaired by the African Union and the Congo on behalf of the Economic Community of Central African States, into an International Support Group co-chaired by the African Union and the United Nations and tasked with coordinating reconstruction efforts in the country. In October, a renewed bout of intercommunal violence in the country resulted in the death of dozens of civilians. Violence was also directed towards the United Nations. On 24 October, four peacekeepers were among those injured during a large-scale protest against the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the Government, at which at least four civilians died.

12. On 8 August, the President of Chad, Idriss Déby Itno, was sworn in for a fifth term of office, amid opposition protests regarding the results of the presidential election held on 10 April. Clashes between the opposition and security forces resulted in one death. On 26 July, 31 opposition parties had created a coalition known as the Front de l'opposition nouvelle pour l'alternance et le changement, which had called upon the people of Chad to unite and protest the new term of office of the President. It subsequently issued a declaration calling for dialogue with the Government under the auspices of international partners, while also emphasizing its intention to call for large-scale action. In response, the Coordination des partis politiques pour la défense de la constitution, an older coalition, decided to expel members who had joined the Front de l'opposition nouvelle.

13. On 14 August, the Prime Minister of Chad, Albert Pahimi Padacké, who had been reappointed by the President on 9 August, announced the new members of his government, comprising 38 members, including seven women. On 26 August, the parliament adopted a five-year political programme presented by the Prime Minister.

14. In the Congo, a former presidential candidate in the 20 March election, Jean-Marie Michel Mokoko, was arrested on 14 June and charged with attempting to undermine State security and with illegal possession of weapons, on 16 June. He was indicted on a new charge, disturbance of public order, on 17 August. Requests for his provisional release have been denied. On 25 July, the President of the opposition party Unis pour le Congo, Paulin Makaya, was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for incitement to engage in disorderly conduct, after having organized an unauthorized demonstration in October 2015 in protest against the constitutional referendum. During a press conference on 29 July, former presidential candidate and opposition leader Guy-Brice Parfait Kolélas called for dialogue under the auspices of the international community and for a presidential pardon of Mr. Mokoko. In early October, the Prime Minister and the Mayor of Brazzaville initiated the

colloquium on the theme "Vivre ensemble", which brought together political protagonists with the aim of adopting recommendations for addressing political grievances for the President's consideration.

15. According to a board of inquiry report submitted on 31 August to the Ministry of Justice of the Congo, the attacks that took place in Brazzaville on 4 April, the same day that the Constitutional Court validated the final results of the presidential election, were the responsibility of the "Ninja" combatants operating under the command of former rebel leader Frédéric Bintsamou, also known as "Pastor Ntumi". The strong response by national security forces to apprehend Mr. Bintsamou notwithstanding, his whereabouts remain unknown. In September, several attacks against security forces, local officials, civilians and humanitarian workers occurred in the Pool region, and they were reportedly perpetrated by suspected "Ninja" combatants. The numbers of those killed and injured remains unconfirmed. A low-intensity conflict has continued in the region.

16. The President of Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Obiang Nguema, named the 36 ministers of his new government on 22 June, following his re-election on 24 April. His eldest son, Teodorin Nguema Obiang Mangue, was promoted to Vice-President, in charge of defense and security, and his other son, Gabriel Mbega Obiang Lima, retained his position of Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons. In total, eight newly appointed ministers, including three women, joined the government.

17. In Gabon, the presidential election was held on 27 August with the participation of regional and international observers. On 31 August, the Minister of the Interior announced the provisional results, in which the incumbent President, Ali Bongo Ondimba, garnered 49.8 per cent of the votes, securing his re-election, whereas the main opposition candidate Jean Ping came a close second, with 48.23 per cent of the votes. Mr. Ping rejected the results and, in the evening on the same day, his supporters clashed with security forces in Libreville and other towns. A number of businesses were looted and the buildings of State institutions, such as the National Assembly, were set ablaze. On 1 September, security forces raided Mr. Ping's campaign headquarters, where a number of opposition leaders and civil society activists were located, and they were subsequently held in de facto detention until 2 September. Internet services, text messaging and social media websites and applications were interrupted for about four weeks. As a result of the unrest, it was reported that three people were killed, an undetermined number of people were injured and more than 800 people were arrested. According to the National Prosecutor, 70 people remained in custody as at early October, including 31 people charged with flagrant acts of violence and 39 people placed in preventive detention for deliberate arson, destruction of public and private property, and looting.

18. On 5 September, the Minister of Justice and Human Rights, who also served as the Second Deputy Prime Minister, resigned from both the government and the ruling party in protest over the disputed presidential election. He called for a recount of the votes by polling station. On the same day, the Chairperson of the African Union, Mr. Déby Itno, announced that a high-level delegation composed of African Heads of State, accompanied by senior officials of the African Union Commission and of the United Nations, would be dispatched to Libreville to meet with stakeholders to defuse tensions. On 8 September, however, the Minister for

Foreign Affairs of Gabon announced the postponement of the planned visit, citing competing commitments in the agendas of the leaders.

19. On 8 September, Mr. Ping filed an appeal before the Constitutional Court for a recount of the votes from each polling station in Haut-Ogooué province, where Mr. Bongo Ondimba had won 95.46 per cent of the votes, with a participation rate of 99.93 per cent, according to the provisional results. Mr. Ping requested equal participation of representatives of his camp and that of Mr. Bongo Ondimba, as well as observers from the international community, during the Court's deliberations. Two other independent candidates also submitted appeals before the Constitutional Court. On 15 September, the legal team of Mr. Bongo Ondimba presented its counter-appeal case before the Court, rejecting the presence of international experts but agreeing to a recount of the votes from each polling station in the contested province.

20. On 24 September, the Constitutional Court upheld Mr. Bongo Ondimba's re-election victory and partially modified the vote count of the election, the final results of which were 50.66 per cent of the votes for the incumbent President and 47.24 per cent for Mr. Ping. It also amended the voter participation rate to 57.35 per cent. No security incidents were reported in Libreville or other major towns following the Court's announcement of the final results. Shortly after the ruling, the President reiterated his intention to create conditions for political dialogue and called upon all political stakeholders to work with him for the greater good of the nation. The same day, Mr. Ping deplored the "flawed justice", accused the Court of bias and vowed not to retreat. The President was sworn in for a second seven-year term of office on 27 September.

21. On 28 September, the President appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, Emmanuel Issoze Ngondet, as Prime Minister and tasked him with forming an inclusive government, the composition of which was announced on 2 October. Although three lesser opposition party members, including a former presidential candidate, joined the cabinet, it does not include prominent allies of Mr. Ping. Several young ministers and twelve women were appointed, raising the representation of women to 30 per cent of the cabinet. A new ministry dedicated to political dialogue was created. To date, Mr. Ping continues to reject the President's invitation to dialogue. Tensions continue to be high in the country, resulting in the limited activity of most public schools and universities since the official beginning of the academic year on 31 October.

22. In Sao Tome and Principe, the presidential election took place in a peaceful environment on 17 July. According to the provisional results released by the electoral commission on 18 July, the candidate of Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada's party Acção Democrática Independente, Evaristo Carvalho, received 50.1 per cent of the votes, whereas the incumbent President, Manuel Pinto da Costa, received 24.8 per cent of the votes. On 21 July, however, the Supreme Court invalidated the provisional results on the grounds that the electoral commission should have waited to announce the results until the completion of the tally of votes cast in the district of Maria Louise, which voted on 20 July, and by voters in the diaspora. Mr. Pinto da Costa and the third-place candidate, Maria das Neves, submitted a complaint requesting the invalidation of the election, the organization of new elections and the resignation of the president of the electoral commission.

23. The Constitutional Court subsequently ordered that a second round take place on 7 August, with the participation of Mr. Carvalho and Mr. Pinto da Costa. The latter, however, boycotted the second round, arguing that his participation would sanction what he described as illegal acts during the electoral period that the Court had not addressed. The second round went forward as scheduled with only the participation of Mr. Carvalho, who was officially declared the victor on 19 August. He was sworn in as President on 3 September.

Boko Haram

24. Violent attacks and suicide bombings by Boko Haram militants continued, including hostage-taking, cattle raiding and raids on villages. There was a resurgence of violence in the Extrême Nord region of Cameroon, including on 21 August in Mora, the headquarters of sector 1 of the Multinational Joint Task Force. On 21 November, Boko Haram conducted three attacks in northern Cameroon, including in Darak, where six Cameroonian soldiers were killed. Suicide bombings continued to serve as the group's modus operandi, with mosques, local markets and other crowded public spaces targeted. Since July 2015, there have been over 40 suicide bombings in Cameroon.

25. In Chad, Boko Haram attacks continued to affect transborder trade and the livelihoods of the local population. On 14 August, two attacks occurred around the area of Kaiga Kinjira, near the Nigerian border, followed by another in the same area on 26 August. During the reporting period, some 850 people, mostly women and children, reportedly associated with Boko Haram, surrendered to the Multinational Joint Task Force in Chad. This brings the total number of defectors in the past few months to about 1,500. The Chadian authorities have called for international assistance with regard to the reintegration of Boko Haram defectors and their families.

26. A schism in the Boko Haram leadership was noted during the reporting period. Abu Musab al-Barnawi was declared the new leader of the group by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as Daesh. The formerly recognized leader, Abubakar Shekau, continued to assert his authority, while maintaining his allegiance to ISIL. The schism was reportedly owing to the fact that he had failed to adhere to guidance from ISIL leadership, including a directive to stop using children as suicide bombers.

27. Multinational Joint Task Force operations continued to target Boko Haram elements in the Lake Chad basin. In particular, the large-scale Operation Gama Aiki was launched in June with the goal of eradicating Boko Haram. On 8 July, the chiefs of defence staff of the four affected countries and the Force Commander of the Joint Task Force met in Diffa, the Niger, to take stock of ongoing military operations.

28. Children, especially young girls, are particularly vulnerable to the insecurity generated in the broader context of the Boko Haram threat. Children are at risk of being abducted and forcibly recruited by Boko Haram, including as suicide bombers. For the most part, boys are kidnapped to join Boko Haram as fighters, and women and girls are abducted primarily for sexual abuse, forced marriages and labour.

Lord's Resistance Army

29. LRA remains a persistent threat to civilians, in particular in eastern Central African Republic and in areas with little to no security presence. One LRA group has also been present in Garamba National Park, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but the bulk of LRA activities in that country during the reporting period occurred in areas bordering the Central African Republic. This suggests that the LRA elements involved in poaching activities in Garamba National Park in recent months had crossed or intended to cross the border. According to defectors, LRA continues to kidnap civilians, including children, and the group intends to abduct young boys and force them into military training.

30. A significant number of LRA-related incidents were noted in the Central African Republic. This was owing to an increase in activities of the Doctor Achaye group, which was responsible for five incidents in August, including an attack on a Ugandan patrol near the village of Kitessa, and the possible movement of LRA elements in Haute-Kotto prefecture towards Kafia Kingi. Incidents of looting involving LRA elements continued, including the 20 August attack on the mining site of Yangou Waka, located near Sam Ouandja.

31. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, LRA elements continued ambushing civilians travelling along key axes within the Dungu and Niangara territories in northeastern Haut-Uélé province, as well as in Ango and Bondo territories, located in north-western Bas-Uélé province at the border with the Central African Republic. LRA-related incidents included ambushes, lootings, the abduction of civilians, who were often forced to transport items, and armed attacks on security forces.

32. Uganda expressed its intention to withdraw its forces operating in the Central African Republic under the auspices of the African Union Regional Task Force by September, but subsequently decided to postpone the withdrawal until 31 December.

33. On 23 August, the Government of the United States of America imposed economic sanctions on two sons of Joseph Kony, Salim and Ali Kony, citing their activities on behalf of their father and LRA. The action freezes any assets held by the two individuals within the United States.

Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea

34. Since my previous report, about 20 incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea have been reported by the International Maritime Organization.

35. From 9 to 12 August, experts from the States members of the Maritime Organization for West and Central Africa met in Lomé to discuss issues linked to maritime security, in advance of the extraordinary summit of the African Union on maritime security and development in Africa, also held in Lomé, on 15 October. The African Union Charter on Maritime Security, Safety and Development was adopted at that summit.

Poaching and the illicit trafficking in wildlife and natural resources

36. On 6 July, in Makoua, the Congo, two traffickers were arrested while trying to sell eight elephant tusks representing 13 kg of ivory. They were sentenced to three

years' imprisonment and fined $3,400. On 9 July, in Franceville, Gabon, two traffickers were arrested while attempting to sell four elephant tusks representing 23 kg of ivory.

37. The regularity of ivory seizures in Central Africa notwithstanding, little progress has been made to dismantle the trafficking networks. Few poachers are caught or prosecuted. Differences and loopholes in national legal frameworks, institutional weaknesses, corruption, the limitations of criminal justice systems and porous borders are exploited by criminal networks, which are also involved in the trafficking of arms, drugs and humans, fuelling further insecurity in the region.

B. Humanitarian developments

38. Violence and conflict across the Lake Chad basin, in the Central African Republic and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continue to be the main drivers of human suffering in the subregion. Around 2.6 million people have been displaced as a result of Boko Haram attacks and military counter-offensives in the broader region. The crisis has left 6.3 million people severely food insecure, with pockets of famine conditions reported in certain locations. The United Nations has also received reports of an increase in the number of incidents of sexual and gender-based violence among the displaced persons.

39. In Cameroon, security in the Extrême Nord region remains unstable. Cross-border raids and suicide bombings by Boko Haram continue to cause deaths and poverty. The Extrême Nord region is host to 72,846 Nigerian refugees. The use of improvised explosive devices by Boko Haram restricts humanitarian access to the internally displaced persons, refugees and host communities. In its eastern region, Cameroon hosts around 260,000 refugees from the Central African Republic, many settling within local communities.

40. In certain areas of the western Lac region of Chad, attacks attributed to Boko Haram and large military operations against the armed group are hampering humanitarian operations and causing new population displacements. Trends show increases in the use of improvised explosive devices and in attacks on villages for the purpose of looting food and livestock. As a result, several humanitarian partners have suspended operations in the health, nutrition and food security sectors. Currently, there are more than 126,000 displaced people, including 109,000 internally displaced persons, 7,900 refugees, 11,000 returnees and 320 third-country nationals. Malnutrition rates continue to be above the emergency threshold in many districts across the Sahel region in Chad. Poor pastoral conditions have decreased livestock prices, reduced pastoralists' revenue and terms of trade and created food consumption deficits. Chad continues to host some 300,000 Sudanese refugees in the east and 69,000 refugees from the Central African Republic in the south.

41. Following a lull in violence during the presidential election period in the Central African Republic, at the end of 2015 and early in 2016, hostilities flared up once again in April and in October, including in Bangui, forcing tens of thousands of civilians to flee for safety — 40,000 in the first half of October alone. Around 410,000 Central Africans remain internally displaced and close to 453,000 are refugees in neighbouring countries. Insecurity in many areas has been the main

impediment to voluntary returns by refugees and internally displaced persons. Across the country, some 2.3 million people, or half the population, require humanitarian assistance. Public and social services are extremely limited or non-existent, with humanitarian organizations providing much of the basic services to the population. Fifty per cent of the rural population is food insecure, with nearly 30 per cent experiencing crisis levels of hunger requiring immediate assistance. Attacks against humanitarian actors have been increasing, seriously undermining the delivery of assistance to those most in need.

42. The humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remained highly challenging, in particular in the east. Continued armed group activity and a reported increase in intercommunal tensions contributed to the displacement of 367,000 people in the first half of 2016 alone, with 1.7 million people currently displaced. The eastern provinces also host the majority of the refugee arrivals from neighbouring countries, a total of 388,000 people originating mainly from Burundi, the Central African Republic, Rwanda and South Sudan. Moreover, during the period under review, a yellow fever epidemic spread to 7 of the country's 26 provinces. A cholera epidemic continued to worsen in the first half of 2016, with the disease spreading from regions in the east in which cholera is endemic towards Kinshasa along the Congo River.

C. Human rights trends

43. The human rights situation in the subregion continued to be of concern during the reporting period, with diverse forms of violations of fundamental freedoms in some countries, mainly targeting political opponents and demonstrators, civil society organizations, human rights defenders and members of the media. The situation reveals the trend of continued narrowing of the democratic space having a negative impact on non-State activities and electoral processes. Violations of the right to freedom of opinion and expression and access to information have included arbitrary arrests and detention, harassment and intimidation of journalists, as well as targeted attacks on media outlets. Service shutdowns and other restrictions have also been used as measures limiting freedom of expression and effective political participation, including in Burundi, Chad, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Gabon.

44. In Gabon, the presidential election was followed by violent unrest in Libreville and elsewhere in the country. The reports of excessive use of force by security forces are a matter of concern. On 29 September, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court issued a statement acknowledging receipt of a referral from the Government of Gabon to open an investigation without delay regarding the situation in the country. The statement indicated that the Court would conduct a preliminary examination to establish whether the criteria for opening an investigation had been met.

45. In Chad, on 24 August, a court in N'Djamena closed the case pertaining to soldiers who reportedly disappeared after voting against the President during the recent presidential election. The Prosecutor stated that all the individuals in question were subsequently found and presented to the court and police in the course of the investigation that had been launched. On 22 September, the United Nations High

Commissioner for Human Rights and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chad signed a host country agreement for the opening of a country office of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Chad.

46. In the Central African Republic, MINUSCA documented 455 new verified incidents of violations or abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law committed against 1,257 victims, including 92 women, 47 boys and 14 girls. The violations included arbitrary killings, cruel and inhuman treatment, conflict-related sexual violence, arbitrary arrests and detentions, as well as abductions.

47. Although the security situation returned largely to normal after the post-electoral political tensions in the Congo earlier in the year, the human rights climate remained fragile, highlighting an acute need for legal and institutional reforms, including of the National Human Rights Commission and the committees charged with reporting to treaty bodies. The Government extended its full cooperation to an OHCHR mission deployed to the country from 13 June to 25 July to assess the human rights situation during the period from the holding of the constitutional referendum in October 2015 to the post-electoral crisis that followed the presidential election of 20 March 2016 and to formulate recommendations to the Government for addressing remaining issues and challenges.

48. A new criminal justice code was promulgated in Cameroon in July, sparking controversy among some sectors. The revised Penal Code retains the death penalty and the criminalization of homosexuality and includes provisions for criminal penalties for unpaid rent and extramarital affairs. It also contains new provisions that protect the rights of women and girls, in particular with regard to the custody of minors and issues related to female genital mutilation, rape and sexual harassment.

D. Socioeconomic trends

49. Several Member States in Central Africa continued to experience the consequences of low commodity prices, increased security costs and insufficient regional integration, which represent a serious threat to the socioeconomic stability of the region. Declining public spending, including through the adoption of austerity measures, has heightened social tensions in several countries. For example, on 31 August, the Government of Chad adopted austerity measures to increase resources and curb public spending, which included reductions in social benefits and allowances and the restructuring of State institutions. As a result, labour unions and students launched an indefinite strike, rejecting the unilateral nature of the measures imposed and accusing the Government of mismanaging oil resources.

50. On 12 July, the Bank of Central African States announced its average growth rate forecast for 2016 for the Central African Economic and Monetary Community area at 1.7 per cent, down from 2.5 per cent in 2015. The average fiscal deficit forecast for 2016 for the area increased to 7.9 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), from 3.5 per cent in 2015. On 12 July, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund announced a 1.9 per cent average growth rate forecast for 2016 for the area. It noted that average external public debt had increased, from 13.1 per cent of GDP in 2012 to an estimated 25.6 per cent for 2016, and called for ensuring debt sustainability. The Executive Board encouraged States members of the

Economic and Monetary Community to focus on fiscal consolidation and structural reforms, including improving the business climate and boosting private investment, and moving the regional integration agenda forward.

51. In order to strengthen its recovery efforts, the Central African Republic, with the support of the United Nations, the World Bank and the European Union, organized a conference on the country's recovery and peacebuilding plan in Brussels on 17 November.

III. Activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

A. Good offices, preventive diplomacy and mediation

52. My Special Representative for Central Africa continued to be actively engaged in the subregion in promoting regional peace and security and preventing conflict, including by undertaking a number of country-specific visits. From 20 to 23 July, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs visited Chad, the Congo and Gabon to discuss national and regional political challenges with various stakeholders. On 21 July, he inaugurated the new UNOCA premises in Libreville.

Central African Republic

53. On 25 August, in Bangui, my Special Representative, in his capacity as the United Nations representative in the international mediation on the crisis in the Central African Republic, attended the ninth meeting of the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic. In his meetings with the Heads of State of the Economic Community of Central African States, he urged for continued engagement by States of the region in consolidating peace in the Central African Republic.

Chad

54. On 7 and 8 June, my Special Representative travelled to Chad where he met with the President of Chad and opposition leader Saleh Kebzabo. He stressed the need for inclusive dialogue, in particular on issues related to political and electoral governance in the run-up to the legislative elections. On 8 August, my Special Representative attended the swearing-in ceremony of the President.

Gabon

55. My Special Representative held intensive engagements with key national stakeholders and regional and international partners to address the electoral crisis in Gabon. He met with the candidates for president, the incumbent, Mr. Bongo Ondimba, and Mr. Ping, as well as their allies and advisers, on several occasions to call for restraint and advocate for a peaceful resolution of the crisis. I also spoke with Mr. Bongo Ondimba and Mr. Ping on 30 August and 4 September to reiterate the importance of avoiding any further escalation of violence. In addition, my Special Representative discussed the situation in Gabon with regional leaders,

namely, the President of the Congo, Denis Sassou Nguesso, in Brazzaville on 14 September, and the President of Chad, in N'Djamena on 16 September.

56. My Special Representative played a key role in defusing post-electoral tensions, in particular regarding the release, on 2 September, of 27 opposition members, who were held at Mr. Ping's campaign headquarters. He repeatedly called for the adjudication of electoral complaints through established legal channels in a transparent, fair and credible manner. He worked closely with the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union, who travelled to Libreville, and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the International Organization of la Francophonie and the Secretary-General of the Economic Community of Central African States to help defuse rising tensions. He also held regular consultations with the President of the Constitutional Court of Gabon to encourage her to preserve the credibility of the appeal process, in particular by making public announcements on the Court's regulations and procedures.

Congo

57. From 30 May to 1 June, my Special Representative travelled to the Congo to assess the situation and to call for a reduction of the tensions stemming from the 20 March presidential election. He met with the President of the Congo, presidential advisers and opposition leaders Mr. Kolélas and Mr. Mokoko. He also visited the Pool region, the theatre of security operations against Pastor Ntumi, in the aftermath of the presidential election. On 26 June and 1 August, he met with the President in Oyo and Brazzaville, respectively. During his visits, he called for an inclusive dialogue and confidence-building measures to chart a peaceful political course in the run-up to the legislative elections to be held in July 2017. He also discussed regional issues.

Rwanda

58. On 25 June 2016, my Special Representative travelled to Rwanda where he met with the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Louise Mushikiwabo, to discuss regional issues, including Rwanda's return to the Economic Community of Central African States and its possible role in fostering peace, security and stability in Central Africa.

Sao Tome and Principe

59. On 4 and 5 August, my Special Representative travelled to Sao Tome and Principe in the run-up to the second round of the presidential election, held on 7 August. He met with the Prime Minister and the presidential candidates. During his visit, my Special Representative called upon political stakeholders to preserve the peaceful nature of the country's competitive politics.

60. A representative from UNOCA also travelled to Sao Tome and Principe during the first and second rounds of the presidential election from 13 to 20 July and from 4 to 10 August, respectively. He met with the presidential candidates, the electoral commission, security officials, civil society organizations and the Head of the African Union electoral observation mission, the former President of Mozambique, Armando Emilio Guebuza. Whereas political stakeholders noted the professionalism

of the electoral commission, they stressed the need to transform it into a permanent body.

Elections

61. UNOCA worked closely with partners to follow up on the recommendations of the workshop held in Douala, Cameroon, in May 2015 on the role of the media in the conduct and promotion of peaceful electoral processes. In this regard, UNOCA, in cooperation with the Subregional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa and with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), organized a workshop in Sao Tome and Principe, held on 25 and 26 May. Participants included journalists and representatives of the National Electoral Commission and the Media High Council. Participants called for assistance to develop a code of ethics and professional conduct for journalists.

62. UNOCA organized a workshop, held in Libreville from 7 to 10 June, on supporting the electoral process by strengthening freedom of expression and the safety of journalists. A key outcome of the workshop was the endorsement of the code of good conduct for the media and journalists of Central Africa during elections, which had been adopted in Douala, Cameroon, in May 2015. At the request of the Gabonese authorities, UNOCA and other United Nations entities, including UNDP, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Subregional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, as well as the International Organization of la Francophonie, supported the organization of similar workshops in Gabon, held in Port-Gentil from 15 to 17 June 2016, Franceville from 22 to 24 June and Oyem from 28 to 30 June.

B. Support to United Nations, regional and subregional initiatives on peace and security

United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa

63. In its capacity as the secretariat of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, UNOCA worked closely with the Chair of the Committee (Central African Republic) to implement the recommendations of the forty-second ministerial meeting, held in Bangui from 6 to 10 June, including the need for States to ratify the Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly and to sign and ratify the Arms Trade Treaty. The next meeting of the Committee is scheduled to be held in Sao Tome and Principe from 28 November to 2 December.

Collaboration with regional, subregional and intergovernmental organizations

64. On 12 August, UNOCA, the International Organization of la Francophonie, the European Union and the United States issued a joint declaration on the election in Gabon, calling upon all stakeholders to ensure the democratic and peaceful

character of the election, prioritize dialogue, refrain from any incitement to violence and ensure respect for human rights.

65. During the electoral crisis in Gabon, the United Nations and the African Union worked jointly in the implementation of confidence-building measures between the Government and the opposition, including releasing detainees, avoiding inflammatory statements and restoring telecommunications services. As agreed with the Government, UNOCA worked with the African Union for the deployment of a high-level delegation of the African Union, which was subsequently postponed indefinitely. The readiness of regional leaders to engage in the resolution of the post-electoral tensions, however, had provided momentum for the facilitation of the by the two organizations.

66. From 13 to 15 June, UNOCA participated in a workshop of the Economic Community of Central African States, held in Yaoundé, regarding the planned revision of texts that govern the functioning of the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa. UNOCA and the Economic Community of Central African States also worked closely on the organization of the activities mentioned in paragraphs 67 and 70, below, on mediation and regional integration.

Mediation

67. From 26 to 27 July, UNOCA, in partnership with the Mediator of the Gabonese Republic and the secretariat of the Economic Community of Central African States, hosted a conference of mediators and ombudsmen of Central Africa in Libreville. The mediators of Gabon and Chad, the ombudsman of Burundi and the Deputy Defender of the People of Equatorial Guinea attended the conference. The imam of Bangui and the president of the Evangelical Alliance of the Central African Republic attended as special guests. Other participants included the First Vice-President of the Senate of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Deputy Public Protector of South Africa and a representative of the mediator of Senegal, in his capacity as Chair of the Association of Mediators of Member Countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union. Participants adopted a declaration on the creation of an association of mediators of States members of the Economic Community of Central African States. A road map to that end is being developed, and a steering committee was established, including representatives of the mediators of Central African States present during the conference, the secretariat of the Economic Community, UNOCA and the Association of Mediators of the Economic and Monetary Union.

Boko Haram

68. UNOCA organized a visit of experts from Member States constituting the Bureau of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Rwanda and Sao Tome and Principe) to Cameroon and Chad from 31 October to 4 November. The experts met with the relevant authorities of both countries to discuss the impact of Boko Haram and visited the town of Kousséri, Cameroon, and the headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force in N'Djamena.

Regional integration

69. On 30 July, my Special Representative attended the opening of the extraordinary session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community held in Malabo. In his address to the Conference, he expressed concern over the political and social impact of the continued decrease in global oil prices on member States of the Economic and Monetary Community. He reiterated his appeal for increased economic diversification and regional integration and improved management of resources.

70. UNOCA and the secretariat of the Economic Community of Central African States co-organized a round table meeting on regional integration in Central Africa, held in Yaoundé on 18 and 19 October. It was attended by relevant ministers and senior government officials from States members of the Economic Community, subregional institutions, experts and development partners. Participants explored ways to relaunch the regional integration process in the subregion, in the light of current challenges.

Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea

71. On 22 July, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs visited the headquarters of the Regional Coordination Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa in Pointe-Noire, the Congo, where he received a briefing on the progress achieved by the Centre and the challenges facing its full operationalization. The Senior Military Adviser to UNOCA also visited the headquarters of the Regional Coordination Centre, from 25 to 27 May, to discuss matters related to the Centre's operationalization.

72. During its visit to Cameroon to discuss Boko Haram, the Bureau of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa also visited the Interregional Coordination Centre for Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea.

Regional strategy and plan of action on counter-terrorism and the non-proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Central Africa

73. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa continued to implement its three-year project on enhancing physical security and stockpile management in selected countries of the Sahel region, including Chad. The Regional Centre co-organized, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chad and the country's focal point on small arms and light weapons, national consultations on the subject, held on 27 and 28 June, which also served to initiate the identification of pilot stockpile sites for rehabilitation. The event brought together 18 representatives of relevant national agencies in Chad that are involved in the field of security regarding small arms and light weapons. It helped to raise awareness about the importance of adopting national legislation and procedures relating to the security, control and management of small arms and light weapons in order to minimize and prevent the risk of accidents and the diversion of arms to non-State actors.

74. On 4 and 5 August, in Abuja, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, in collaboration with the Commission of the Economic

Community of West African States, held an expert meeting on improving cross-border subregional cooperation in the control of small arms and light weapons under existing regional and subregional instruments. The meeting took place within the framework of the Regional Centre's project on strengthening the capacity of Lake Chad basin countries to implement Security Council resolution 2178 (2014) by preventing the acquisition of arms and ammunition by terrorist groups. The meeting convened more than 30 representatives of the four beneficiary countries and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations and institutions.

Coordination of the implementation of the United Nations regional strategy to address the threat and impact of the Lord's Resistance Army

Operationalization of the African Union Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army

75. From 9 to 13 August, representatives of UNOCA, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the African Union undertook an assessment mission to Obo and Bria in eastern Central African Republic. They met with a wide variety of stakeholders who underlined the growing number of LRA attacks and abductions in the area and the risk that both LRA and ex-Séléka groups would strengthen their capacity following the withdrawal of the Ugandan forces operating under the African Union Regional Task Force. Humanitarian needs in the area were also a key topic of discussion.

76. From 24 to 28 October, representatives of UNOCA and the African Union undertook an assessment mission to Dungu in northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The mission noted that LRA remained a serious threat to local communities there, even though the capacity of the group had been reduced.

77. Pursuant to the conclusions of the fifth ministerial meeting of the Joint Coordination Mechanism of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army, held in Addis Ababa on 19 and 20 May, which were endorsed by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 30 May, the Commission of the African Union conducted a joint technical assessment mission to LRA-affected areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and South Sudan, from 20 to 25 June. The aim of the mission was to assess, among other things, the impact of Uganda's announced withdrawal of its contingent from the African Union Regional Task Force by September 2016. The European Union, the United States, the African Union, including the Force Commander of the Regional Task Force, and the United Nations Office to the African Union took part in the assessment mission. It established that, although considerable progress had been made in degrading the capacities of LRA, the group remained an active threat in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan. The presence of other armed groups in the region, including the ex-Séléka faction and the Janjaweed militia, further complicated the campaign to eliminate LRA.

78. The assessment of the mission was that the possible non-renewal of the mandate of United States special forces, which ended on 31 October, would deprive the African Union Regional Task Force of its main provider of logistical support.

The situation would be exacerbated by the withdrawal of Ugandan forces from the Task Force. Since then, the mandate of the special forces has been renewed until early 2017.

Protection of civilians and humanitarian assistance

79. Through Operation Red Kite, MONUSCO provided logistical support to the offensive against LRA that was successfully launched by the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including its contingent operating under the African Union Regional Task Force, which is assisted by the United States military.

80. MONUSCO, jointly with the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, intensified patrols in the LRA-affected areas of Dungu territory, in particular Badolo, Nambia and Nagero. MONUSCO and MINUSCA have also intensified their information exchanges on LRA-related issues.

81. Within the framework of the implementation of the early warning system, the secured, empowered, connected communities project, implemented by Catholic Relief Services and supported by the Government of the United States, five high-frequency radios were installed in the area around Bangadi and in Kapili.

Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration

82. The MONUSCO transit camp in Dungu accommodated 27 LRA dependents, comprising 10 Congolese nationals, 8 Ugandan nationals, 5 Central African nationals and 4 South Sudanese nationals. All of them were repatriated by MONUSCO, with the support of the International Committee of the Red Cross, to their home countries or reunited with their families in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Long-term development and peacebuilding support

83. Stabilization and recovery efforts in LRA-affected areas remain seriously underfunded and mostly unaddressed. State authorities and humanitarian and development actors, including United Nations entities, are largely absent.

C. Enhancing United Nations coherence and coordination in the subregion

84. The Regional Policy Adviser for West and Central Africa of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), who is based in Dakar, visited Libreville on 25 and 26 July to discuss cooperation with UNOCA and the Economic Community of Central African States in supporting regional initiatives in the area of women and peace and security. A number of initiatives were identified, including joint support to the Economic Community to create a women's peace network in Central Africa.

IV. Observations and recommendations

85. In the context of the continued political tensions in the subregion linked to the conduct and aftermath of a number of electoral processes, I call upon all stakeholders to resolve their differences in a peaceful manner, including through inclusive dialogue and mediation, and in conformity with existing legal frameworks. The peaceful holding of elections is the shared responsibility of all political leaders. I welcome the key role played by international and regional observers and stress the importance of the free and responsible participation of the media. I call upon the Governments concerned to ensure that elections and the follow-up to them, including appeals of official results, are conducted in a transparent manner to guarantee the credibility of electoral processes. I urge the Governments concerned to ensure that internal security measures and/or operations are conducted in conformity with international human rights law. My Special Representative will continue to carry out his good offices role and engage in preventive diplomacy with all relevant stakeholders.

86. I welcome the signing on 15 November of the special agreement by the Presidents of Equatorial Guinea and Gabon for the submission of their border dispute to the International Court of Justice. This marks a historic milestone and the successful conclusion of the United Nations mediation process. I hope that the settlement of this long-standing border dispute will be a source of inspiration for other countries facing similar challenges and a step forward for the further enhancement of bilateral relations between the two countries.

87. I am heartened by the efforts in the region in the fight against Boko Haram, which have resulted in substantial military successes. At the same time, the terrorist group remains a serious threat to regional peace and security, and its activities continue to inflict a devastating toll on the political, socioeconomic, humanitarian and human rights situation in the affected areas. I call upon all the Governments concerned to stay the course and further scale up their efforts, in full conformity with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, to address both the immediate manifestations of the Boko Haram violence and the root causes of the crisis. In equal measure, I urge the international community to redouble its support to the region in the fight against Boko Haram, including the vital humanitarian and early recovery assistance and the requisite political, logistical and financial support to the Multinational Joint Task Force and the Lake Chad Basin Commission. I encourage the Economic Community of Central African States and the Economic Community of West African States to hold, without further delay, the planned summit of Heads of State on Boko Haram with the aim of developing a regional strategy to address the Boko Haram crisis, in particular the root causes that have contributed to the emergence and endurance of the group. UNOCA and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) stand ready to support the two subregional organizations in this regard.

88. I am encouraged by the progress made in the implementation of the maritime security strategy, including efforts to operationalize the Interregional Coordination Centre for Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea. I renew my call upon regional States and international partners to provide the resources necessary for the Centre's full functioning. UNOCA, in collaboration with UNOWAS, will

continue to provide assistance and mobilize support in combating maritime insecurity. I welcome the adoption of the African Union Charter on Maritime Security, Safety and Development.

89. I remain concerned by the phenomenon of poaching and illicit wildlife trafficking and its negative impact on the environmental, governance and security situation in the subregion, including the continuing links between illicit wildlife trade and armed groups. I renew my call upon Governments in the subregion to take definite steps towards the implementation of the specific measures needed to operationalize the strategic decisions on countering illicit wildlife trade, including those contained in General Assembly resolution 69/314 and the African Strategy on Combating Illegal Exploitation and Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora in Africa. In collaboration with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNOCA will continue to support subregional efforts to identify collaborative approaches to address the issue.

90. While progress continues in the fight against LRA, the group continues to demonstrate its intention and capacity to conduct attacks against civilians in the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The planned withdrawal of Ugandan forces from the African Union Regional Task Force will require redoubled commitment from national, regional and international stakeholders to ensure that LRA is not able to exploit the resulting gap. I urge all stakeholders to remain engaged politically, financially and militarily, including through the funding of humanitarian programmes in LRA-affected areas. I am grateful for the dedication and commitment displayed by the Ugandan forces, and by military personnel of the Task Force and contributing countries, for their continuing efforts and operations, which are crucial to ending the threat posed by LRA.

91. I would like to express my appreciation to the Governments of Central African countries, the Economic Community of Central African States, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, the African Union, the Gulf of Guinea Commission, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and other regional and subregional institutions for their continued collaboration with UNOCA. I would also like to express my appreciation to the Multinational Joint Task Force and troop-contributing countries for their dedication and commitment to the service of peace and stability. I am grateful to the Government and people of Gabon for their generous hospitality and support to UNOCA. I would like to thank the various entities of the United Nations system working in Central Africa, including the heads of United Nations peace operations, regional offices, country teams and other entities, for their support and cooperation with UNOCA.

92. In conclusion, I would like to express my deep appreciation to my outgoing Special Representative, Mr. Bathily, for his unwavering commitment, dedication and hard work during his term in office. I would also like to thank my Acting Special Representative, Mr. Fall, for having accepted this challenging assignment. I commend the staff of UNOCA for their continuing efforts to advance the cause of peace and security in Central Africa.

United Nations S/2016/997

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 November 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 26 November 2016 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to write to you to draw your attention to the barbaric terrorist attack on 24 November 2016 at a gas station on a highway 100 km south of Baghdad, Iraq, which killed or injured more than 150 people, most of them Iranian pilgrims en route back from a religious gathering in the city of Karbala. The blast from the explosives-laden truck set afire five pilgrim buses, killing scores of innocent people in the buses and surrounding areas. Regrettably, it is not the first terrorist attack of this kind; as in recent years, scores of Iranian pilgrims have lost their lives in similar attacks.

The Iranian people and Government have done and continue to do all in their power to help eradicate Daesh, which has claimed responsibility for the attack, and its affiliates and other terrorist groups and elements. This horrendous act of terrorism and so many other similar acts in which many thousands of innocent souls have perished in Iraq and Syria and many other places should remind all of us of our duty to effectively help destroy terrorist groups. It should also serve as a reminder to those who have spread destructive Takfiri ideology and sectarian hatred and helped terrorist groups in different ways to stop their acts and join the international community in the fight against violent extremism and terrorism.

While we expect that the United Nations condemns this terrorist attack in the strongest possible way, my people and Government also expect that the United Nations, especially the Security Council, will live up to the expectations of peoples and Member States and take concrete actions in addressing the scourge of terrorism.

I should be grateful if you have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gholamhossein **Dehghani**
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

16-20976 (E) 301116

Please recycle

United Nations S/2016/998

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 November 2016
English
Original: French

Letter dated 28 November 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the thirty-eighth monthly report of the Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) (see annex). The report covers the period from 23 October to 22 November 2016.

With regard to the destruction of the chemical weapons production facilities declared by the Syrian Arab Republic, no progress has been made. In his note addressed to the OPCW Executive Council, the Director General again indicates that the poor security situation on the ground continues to prevent both the Syrian Government and the OPCW secretariat from safely accessing the remaining hangar and the two stationary above-ground facilities.

With regard to the initial declaration by the Syrian Arab Republic and its subsequent submissions, I reiterate the need for the Syrian Government and the OPCW secretariat to work together to fill all gaps and resolve all inconsistencies and discrepancies. Only then will the international community be satisfied that the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic no longer exists. In this regard, I note that, on 11 November 2016, the OPCW Executive Council decided to include the issue of the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme on the agenda of all its sessions until it has been determined that all elements of that programme have been dismantled.

I welcome the extension of the mandate of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism as a vital step towards ensuring that those involved in the use of chemical weapons are held accountable. Security Council resolution 2319 (2016) provides new details to guide the work of the Mechanism going forward, and we must now focus on the task ahead. I reiterate the importance of continued unity on this issue within the Security Council. The taboo against chemical weapons must be upheld.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

16 21024 (E) 301116 301116

Please recycle

Annex

Letter dated 24 November 2016 from the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled "Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme" prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of the OPCW Executive Council Decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 and United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), both dated 27 September 2013, for transmission to the Security Council. My report covers the period from 23 October to 22 November 2016 and also covers the reporting requirements of the Executive Council decision EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013.

(*Signed*) Ahmet **Üzümcü**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Note by the Director-General

Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme

1. In accordance with subparagraph 2(f) of the decision by the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") at its Thirty-Third Meeting (EC-M-33/DEC.1, dated 27 September 2013), the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") is to report to the Council on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of that decision. In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the report by the Secretariat is also to be submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General.

2. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled "Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities" (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of that decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat should report on its implementation "in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2(f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1".

3. The Council, at its Forty-Eighth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled "Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria" (EC-M-48/DEC.1, dated 4 February 2015) noting the Director-General's intent to include reports of the OPCW Fact Finding Mission (FFM) in Syria, along with information on the Council's discussion thereof, as part of the monthly reporting pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). Similarly, the Council, at its Eighty-First Session, adopted a decision entitled "Report by the Director-General Regarding the Declaration and Related Submissions by the Syrian Arab Republic" (EC-81/DEC.4, dated 23 March 2016), noting the Director General's intent to provide information on the implementation of that decision.

4. The Council, at its Eighty-Third Session, adopted a decision entitled "OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism Reports on Chemical Weapons Use in the Syrian Arab Republic" (EC-83/DEC.5, dated 11 November 2016). In subparagraph 12(a) of that decision, the Council decided that the Director-General shall "regularly inform the Council on the implementation of this decision and incorporate information regarding the implementation of this decision into his monthly reporting to the United Nations Security Council, through the United Nations Secretary-General, regarding EC-M-33/DEC.1".

5. This, the thirty-eighth monthly report, is therefore submitted in accordance with the aforementioned Council decisions, and includes information relevant to the period from 23 October to 22 November 2016.

Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of Executive Council decisions EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1

6. Progress by the Syrian Arab Republic is as follows:

(a) The Secretariat has verified the destruction of 24 of the 27 chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) declared by the Syrian Arab Republic. However, the poor security situation continues to preclude safe access both for the Syrian Arab Republic to destroy the remaining aircraft hangar, which stands ready to accept the explosive charges, and for the Secretariat to confirm the condition of the two stationary above ground facilities. As part of the agreed yearly verification activities, a team of the Secretariat left the OPCW Headquarters on 13 November 2016 to visit the five destroyed underground structures in order to verify the integrity of the interior plugs.

(b) On 16 November 2016, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted to the Council its thirty-sixth monthly report (EC-84/P/NAT.2, dated 16 November 2016) regarding activities on its territory related to the destruction of its CWPFs, as required by paragraph 19 of EC M 34/DEC.1.

Progress in the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons by States Parties hosting destruction activities

7. As reported previously, all of the chemicals declared by the Syrian Arab Republic that were removed from its territory in 2014 have now been destroyed.

Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to Executive Council decision EC-81/DEC.4

8. As reported previously, through a letter dated 13 October 2016, the Syrian Arab Republic declared certain parts of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) under Article III of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter "the Convention").

9. On 1 November 2016, the Secretariat replied to the aforementioned letter, informing the Syrian Government that the Secretariat considered the submitted declaration regarding the SSRC as incomplete, and urging the Syrian Arab Republic to declare all relevant parts of the SSRC under Articles III and VI of the Convention.

10. During a briefing to States Parties on 15 November 2016, the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) provided an overview of the outstanding issues with regard to the Syrian Arab Republic's declaration, which could be clustered into three categories:

(a) The role of the SSRC in the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme;

(b) The results of the analyses of samples collected at multiple locations in the Syrian Arab Republic; and

(c) Other chemical weapons-related activities that were undertaken prior to the Syrian Arab Republic's accession to the Convention.

Other activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic

11. An agreement to extend until the end of May 2017 the support provided by the United Nations Office for Project Services to the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic has been concluded.

12. As requested by the Council at its Seventy-Fifth Session (paragraph 7.12 of EC-75/2, dated 7 March 2014), the Secretariat, on behalf of the Director-General, has continued to brief States Parties in The Hague on its activities.

13. As at the cut-off date of this report, four OPCW staff members were deployed as part of the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic, three of whom had been involved in the verification activities related to the five underground structures.

Supplementary resources

14. As previously reported, a Trust Fund for Syria Missions was established in November 2015 to support the FFM and other remaining activities, such as those of the DAT. As at the cut-off date of this report, contribution agreements totalling EUR 7.8 million had been concluded with Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Monaco, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States of America, and the European Union. Pledges from other donors have been made and are currently being processed.

Activities carried out with respect to the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria

15. Guided by Council decisions EC-M-48/DEC.1 and EC-M-50/DEC.1 (dated 23 November 2015), as well as by United Nations Security Council resolution 2209 (2015), the FFM continued to study all available information relating to allegations of use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. As presented during the briefing to States Parties on 15 November 2016, 66 incidents of alleged use have been recorded and analysed since December 2015, 28 of which had been reported since 1 August 2016. Particular attention was given to widely reported incidents such as in Saraqib on 1 August 2016, Aleppo on 2 August 2016, Zubdiya on 10 August 2016, Al-Sukkari on 6 September 2016, and Kafr Zita on 1 October 2016.

16. As reported previously, in response to the letter of 15 August 2016 from the Syrian Arab Republic requesting the FFM to investigate an incident of alleged use of chemical weapons on 2 August 2016 in the area of Al-Awamid in Aleppo, a team was deployed to Damascus in September and October 2016. During the reporting period, the FFM continued with the translation and analysis of the interviews conducted and documentation provided during the missions, and also analysed the received samples.

17. Additionally, the FFM has begun to examine the information received in a letter of 16 November 2016 from H.E. Dr Faisal Mekdad, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic, requesting the Director-General to dispatch OPCW experts to investigate three incidents reported to have occurred on 31 October, and 3 and 13 November 2016 in the city of Aleppo. The Russian Federation has offered to provide samples and other material in relation to the alleged incident in Hamdaniyeh and Dahiyet al-Assad in the city of Aleppo. The OPCW proposed to

receive them in Damascus or in The Hague. The team will continue to work with the National Authority of the Syrian Arab Republic to gather more information.

Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to Executive Council decision EC-83/DEC.5

18. The Head of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, under cover of a letter to the Director-General dated 28 October 2016, provided the fourth report of the Joint Investigative Mechanism and requested that the Council be informed thereof. The report was submitted to the United Nations Security Council on 24 October 2016 pursuant to Security Council resolution 2235 (2015), and has since been made available to the Council in accordance with paragraph 11 of that resolution.

19. As reported in paragraph 4 above, the Council adopted decision EC-83/DEC.5 by voting on 11 November 2016, and the Secretariat has begun the initial preparatory work in view of its implementation.

Conclusion

20. The main focus of the future activities of the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic will be on the implementation of Council decisions EC-83/DEC.5 and EC-81/DEC.4 and on the activities of the FFM, as well as on the destruction and verification of the remaining aircraft hangar, confirmation of the status of the two stationary above ground facilities, and annual inspections of the underground structures already verified as destroyed.

United Nations S/2016/999

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 November 2016

Original: English

Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uruguay: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), resolution 2087 (2013), resolution 2094 (2013), and resolution 2270 (2016), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),

Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Expressing its gravest concern at the nuclear test by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("the DPRK") on September 9, 2016 in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016), and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("the NPT") and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,

Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community,

Underlining also that measures imposed by this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK,

Expressing serious concern that the DPRK has continued to violate relevant Security Council resolutions through repeated launches and attempted launches of

Please recycle

ballistic missiles, and *noting* that all such ballistic missile activities contribute to the DPRK's development of nuclear weapons delivery systems and increase tension in the region and beyond,

Expressing continued concern that the DPRK is abusing the privileges and immunities accorded under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations,

Expressing great concern that the DPRK's prohibited arms sales have generated revenues that are diverted to the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles while DPRK citizens have unmet needs,

Expressing its gravest concern that the DPRK's ongoing nuclear- and ballistic missile-related activities have further generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and *determining* that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. *Condemns* in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 9 September 2016 in violation and flagrant disregard of the Security Council's resolutions;

2. *Reaffirms* its decisions that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation; shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches; shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities; and shall abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;

3. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in annex I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and *decides* further that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the individuals listed in annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;

4. *Decides* that the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in annex III of this resolution;

5. *Reaffirms* the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a) (iii) of resolution 1718 (2006) regarding luxury goods, and *clarifies* that the term "luxury goods" includes also, but is not limited to, the items specified in annex IV of this resolution;

6. *Reaffirms* paragraphs 14 through 16 of resolution 1874 (2009), and paragraph 8 of resolution 2087 (2013), and *decides* that these paragraphs shall apply

also with respect to any items the supply, sale or transfer of which is prohibited by this resolution;

7. *Decides* that the measures imposed in paragraphs 8 (a), 8 (b), and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the items listed in a new conventional arms dual-use list to be adopted by the Committee, *directs* the Committee to adopt this list within 15 days and to report to the Security Council to this effect, and further *decides* that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adopt the list within seven days of receiving that report, and *directs* the Committee to update this list every 12 months;

8. *Decides* that paragraph 19 of resolution 2270 (2016) shall apply with respect to all leasing, chartering or provision of crew services to the DPRK without exception, unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance;

9. *Decides* that paragraph 20 of resolution 2270 (2016) shall apply to registering vessels in the DPRK, obtaining authorization for a vessel to use the DPRK flag, and owning, leasing, operating, providing any vessel classification, certification or associated service, or insuring any vessel flagged by the DPRK, without exception, unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance;

10. *Clarifies* that, for the purposes of implementing paragraph 17 of resolution 2270 (2016), specialized teaching and training which could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems includes, but is not limited to advanced materials science, advanced chemical engineering, advanced mechanical engineering, advanced electrical engineering and advanced industrial engineering;

11. *Decides* that all Member States shall suspend scientific and technical cooperation involving persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the DPRK except for medical exchanges unless:

(a) In the case of scientific or technical cooperation in the fields of nuclear science and technology, aerospace and aeronautical engineering and technology, or advanced manufacturing production techniques and methods, the Committee has determined on a case-by-case basis that a particular activity will not contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or ballistic missile-related programmes; or

(b) In the case of all other scientific or technical cooperation, the State engaging in scientific or technical cooperation determines that the particular activity will not contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or ballistic missile-related programmes and notifies the Committee in advance of such determination;

12. *Decides* that the Committee, if it has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessels are or have been related to nuclear- or ballistic missile-related programmes or activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution, may require any or all of the following measures with respect to vessels it designates pursuant to this paragraph: (a) the Flag State of a designated vessel shall de-flag the vessel; (b) the Flag State of a designated vessel shall direct the vessel to a port

identified by the Committee, in coordination with the port State; (c) all Member States shall prohibit a designated vessel from entering their ports, unless in case of emergency, in case of return to the vessel's port of origination, or in case of direction by the Committee; (d) a vessel designated by the Committee shall be subject to the asset freeze imposed in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006);

13. *Expresses concern* that the personal luggage and checked baggage of individuals entering into or departing from the DPRK may be used to transport items the supply, sale or transfer of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution, and *clarifies* that such luggage and baggage constitute "cargo" for the purposes of implementing paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016);

14. *Calls upon* all Member States to reduce the number of staff at DPRK diplomatic missions and consular posts;

15. *Decides* that all Member States shall take steps to restrict the entry into or transit through their territory of members of the Government of the DPRK, officials of that Government, and members of the DPRK armed forces, if the State determines that such members or officials are associated with the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), or this resolution;

16. *Decides* that all States shall take steps to limit the number of bank accounts to one per DPRK diplomatic mission and consular post, and one per accredited DPRK diplomat and consular officer, at banks in their territory;

17. *Recalls* that, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, a diplomatic agent shall not in the receiving State practice for personal profit any professional or commercial activity, and *emphasizes* accordingly that DPRK diplomatic agents are prohibited in the receiving State from such practice of professional or commercial activity;

18. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit the DPRK from using real property that it owns or leases in their territory for any purpose other than diplomatic or consular activities;

19. *Recalls* that a Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council, and that the exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council;

20. *Recalls* that paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016) requires all States to inspect the cargo within or transiting through their territory, including their airports, that has originated in the DPRK, or that is destined for the DPRK, or has been brokered or facilitated by the DPRK or its nationals, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, or by designated individuals or entities, or that is being transported on DPRK-flagged aircraft, emphasizes that this measure requires States to inspect DPRK-flagged aircraft when they land in or take off from their territory, recalls also that paragraph 31 of resolution 2270 (2016) requires all States to prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or

aircraft, of aviation fuel, to the territory of the DPRK, and *calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance to ensure that no more fuel is provided to DPRK-flagged civil passenger aircraft than is necessary for the relevant flight, including a standard margin for safety of flight;

21. *Expresses* concern that prohibited items may be transported to and from the DPRK by rail and by road, and *underscores* that the obligation in paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016) to inspect the cargo within or transiting through their territory includes the cargo being transported by rail and by road;

22. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction from providing insurance or re-insurance services to vessels owned, controlled, or operated, including through illicit means, by the DPRK unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that the vessel is engaged in activities exclusively for livelihood purposes which will not be used by DPRK individuals or entities to generate revenue or exclusively for humanitarian purposes;

23. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit their nationals from procuring vessel and aircraft crewing services from the DPRK;

24. *Decides* that all Member States shall de-register any vessel that is owned, controlled, or operated by the DPRK, and further *decides* that Member States shall not register any such vessel that has been de-registered by another Member State pursuant to this paragraph;

25. *Notes* that, for the purpose of implementing resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and this resolution, the term "transit" includes but is not limited to the travel of individuals through a State's international airport terminals en route to a destination in another State, regardless of whether such individuals pass through customs or passport control at that airport;

26. *Decides* that paragraph 29 of resolution 2270 (2016) shall be replaced by the following:

> "*Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, coal, iron, and iron ore, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such material from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, and *decides* that this provision shall not apply with respect to:
>
> (a) Coal that the procuring State confirms on the basis of credible information has originated outside the DPRK and was transported through the DPRK solely for export from the Port of Rajin (Rason), provided that the State notifies the Committee in advance and such transactions are unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution;
>
> (b) Total exports to all Member States of coal originating in the DPRK that in the aggregate do not exceed 53,495,894 US dollars or 1,000,866 metric tons, whichever is lower, between the date of adoption of this resolution and 31 December 2016, and total exports to all Member States of coal originating

in the DPRK that in the aggregate do not exceed 400,870,018 US dollars or 7,500,000 metric tons per year, whichever is lower, beginning 1 January 2017, provided that the procurements (i) involve no individuals or entities that are associated with the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution, including designated individuals or entities, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, directly or indirectly, or individuals or entities assisting in the evasion of sanctions, and (ii) are exclusively for livelihood purposes of DPRK nationals *and* unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution, and *decides* that each Member State that procures coal from the DPRK shall notify the Committee of the aggregate amount of the volume of such procurement for each month no later than 30 days after the conclusion of that month on the form in annex V to this resolution, *directs* the Committee to make publicly available on its website the volume of procurement of coal from the DPRK reported by Member States and value calculated by the Committee Secretary, as well as the amount reported for each month and with the number of States that reported for each month, *directs* the Committee to update this information on a real-time basis as it receives notifications, *calls upon* all States that import coal from the DPRK to periodically review this website to ensure that they do not exceed the mandatory aggregate annual limit, *directs* the Committee Secretary to notify all Member States when an aggregate value or volume of coal procurements from the DPRK of 75 per cent of the aggregate yearly amount has been reached, also *directs* the Committee Secretary to notify all Member States when an aggregate value or volume of coal procurements from the DPRK of 90 per cent of the aggregate yearly amount has been reached, further *directs* the Committee Secretary to notify all Member States when an aggregate value or volume of coal procurements from the DPRK of 95 per cent of the aggregate yearly amount has been reached and to inform them that they must immediately cease procuring coal from the DPRK for the year, and *requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to this effect and provide additional resources in this regard; and

(c) Transactions in iron and iron ore that are determined to be exclusively for livelihood purposes and unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution."

27. *Directs* the Panel of Experts, following the end of each month, to determine and transmit to the Committee, in no more than 30 days, an estimate of the average (mean) price in US dollars of coal exported from the DPRK that month based on credible and factually accurate trade data, and *directs* the Committee Secretary to use this average price as the basis to calculate the value of the procurement of coal from the DPRK each month based on the volume reported by States for the purposes of notifying all member states and making publicly available

DRPK export levels on the Committee website on a real-time basis as required in paragraph 26 of this resolution;

28. *Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, copper, nickel, silver and zinc, and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such material from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK;

29. *Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, statues, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance;

30. *Decides* that all Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of new helicopters and vessels, except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis;

31. *Decides* that Member States shall take the necessary measures to close existing representative offices, subsidiaries or banking accounts in the DPRK within 90 days, unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such offices, subsidiaries or accounts are required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance or the activities of diplomatic missions in the DPRK or the activities of the United Nations or its specialized agencies or related organizations or any other purpose consistent with the objectives of this resolution;

32. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit public and private financial support from within their territories or by persons or entities subject to their jurisdiction for trade with the DPRK (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade), except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis;

33. *Decides* that, if a Member State determines that an individual is working on behalf of or at the direction of a DPRK bank or financial institution, then Member States shall expel the individual from their territories for the purpose of repatriation to the individual's state of nationality, consistent with applicable national and international law, unless the presence of the individual is required for fulfillment of a judicial process or exclusively for medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or the Committee has determined on a case-by-case basis that the expulsion of the individual would be contrary to the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), or this resolution;

34. *Expresses* concern that DPRK nationals are sent to work in other States for the purpose of earning hard currency that the DPRK uses for its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, and *calls upon* States to exercise vigilance over this practice;

35. *Reiterates* its concern that bulk cash may be used to evade measures imposed by the Security Council, and *calls upon* Member States to be alert to this risk;

36. *Calls upon* all Member States to report to the Security Council within 90 days of the adoption of this resolution, and thereafter upon request by the Committee, on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, *requests* the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), in cooperation with other UN sanctions monitoring groups, to continue its efforts to assist Member States in preparing and submitting such reports in a timely manner;

37. *Reaffirms* that Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) obligates all States to take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials, and *notes* that these obligations are complementary to the obligations in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016) to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes;

38. *Calls upon* all Member States to redouble efforts to implement in full the measures in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016), and to cooperate with each other in doing so, particularly with respect to inspecting, detecting and seizing items the transfer of which is prohibited by these resolutions;

39. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718 (2006), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution and *further decides* that the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009) and modified in paragraph 1 of resolution 2276 (2016), shall also apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution;

40. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable or unusable, storage, or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution that are identified in inspections, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of 29 April 1997, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972;

41. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or

of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions;

42. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide additional administrative and analytical support resources needed to increase the capacity of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) and strengthen its ability to analyse the DPRK's sanctions violation and evasion activities, to include additional funding allocated to the procurement of aerial imagery and analysis services, access to relevant trade and international security databases and other information sources, as well as support the resulting increased activities of the Committee by the Secretariat;

43. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to include findings and recommendations in its midterm reports, beginning with the midterm report due to be submitted to the Committee by no later than 5 August 2017;

44. *Directs* the Committee, with the assistance of its Panel of Experts, to hold special meetings on important thematic and regional topics and Member States' capacity challenges, to identify, prioritize, and mobilize resources to areas that would benefit from technical and capacity-building assistance to enable more effective implementation by Member States;

45. *Reiterates* its deep concern at the grave hardship that the people in the DPRK are subjected to, *condemns* the DPRK for pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles instead of the welfare of its people while people in the DPRK have great unmet needs, and *emphasizes* the necessity of the DPRK respecting and ensuring the welfare and inherent dignity of people in the DPRK;

46. *Reaffirms* that the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, that are not prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and this resolution, and the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK, and *decides* that the Committee may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions if the Committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of such organizations in the DPRK or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions;

47. *Reaffirms* its support to the Six Party Talks, *calls* for their resumption, and *reiterates* its support for the commitments set forth in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States, including that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, that the United States and the DPRK undertook to respect each other's

sovereignty and exist peacefully together, and that the Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation, and all other relevant commitments;

48. *Reiterates* the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large, and *expresses* its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and stresses the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond;

49. *Affirms* that it shall keep the DPRK's actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK's compliance, and, in this regard, *expresses its determination* to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK nuclear test or launch;

50. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex I

Travel Ban/Asset Freeze (Individuals)

1. PAK CHUN IL

   a. *Description*: Pak Chun Il has served as the DPRK Ambassador to Egypt and provides support to KOMID.

   b. *AKA*: n/a

   c. *Identifiers*: DOB: 28 July 1954; Nationality: DPRK; Passport: 563410091

2. KIM SONG CHOL

   a. *Description*: Kim Song Chol is a KOMID official that has conducted business in Sudan on behalf of KOMID's interests.

   b. *AKA*: Kim Hak Song

   c. *Identifiers*: DOB: 26 March 1968, alt. DOB: 15 October 1970; Nationality: DPRK; Passport: 381420565, alt. Passport: 654120219

3. SON JONG HYOK

   a. *Description*: Son Jong Hyok is a KOMID official that has conducted business in Sudan on behalf of KOMID's interests.

   b. *AKA*: Son Min

   c. *Identifiers*: DOB: 20 May 1980; Nationality: DPRK

4. KIM SE GON

   a. *Description*: Kim Se Gon works on behalf of the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry.

   b. *AKA*: n/a

   c. *Identifiers*: DOB: 13 November 1969; Passport: PD472310104; Nationality: DPRK

5. RI WON HO

   a. *Description*: Ri Won Ho is a DPRK Ministry of State Security Official stationed in Syria supporting KOMID.

   b. *AKA*: n/a

   c. *Identifiers*: DOB: 17 July 1964; Passport: 381310014, Nationality: DPRK

6. JO YONG CHOL

   a. *Description*: Jo Yong Chol is a DPRK Ministry of State Security Official stationed in Syria supporting KOMID.

   b. *AKA*: Cho Yong Chol

   c. *Identifiers*: DOB: 30 September 1973, Nationality: DPRK

7. KIM CHOL SAM

   a. *Description*: Kim Chol Sam is a representative for Daedong Credit Bank (DCB) who has been involved in managing transactions on behalf of DCB Finance Limited. As an overseas-based representative of DCB, it is suspected that Kim Chol Sam has facilitated transactions worth hundreds of thousands of dollars and likely managed millions of dollars in DPRK related accounts with potential links to nuclear/missile programmes.

   b. *AKA*: n/a

   c. *Identifiers*: DOB: 11 March 1971; Nationality: DPRK

8. KIM SOK CHOL

   a. *Description*: Kim Sok Chol acted as the DPRK Ambassador to Myanmar and he operates as a KOMID facilitator. He was paid by KOMID for his assistance and arranges meetings on behalf of KOMID, including a meeting between KOMID and Myanmar's defense related persons to discuss financial matters.

   b. *AKA*: n/a

   c. *Identifiers*: DOB: 8 May 1955; Passport 472310082; Nationality: DPRK

9. CHANG CHANG HA

   a. *Description*: Chang Chang Ha is the President of the Second Academy of Natural Sciences (SANS).

   b. *AKA*: Jang Chang Ha

   c. *Identifiers*: DOB: 10 January 1964; Nationality: DPRK

10. CHO CHUN RYONG

   a. *Description*: Cho Chun Ryong is the Chairman of the Second Economic Committee (SEC).

   b. *AKA*: Jo Chun Ryong

   c. *Identifiers*: DOB: 4 April 1960; Nationality: DPRK

11. SON MUN SAN

   a. *Description*: Son Mun San is the Director-General of the External Affairs Bureau of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE).

   b. *AKA*: n/a

   c. *Identifiers*: DOB: 23 January 1951; Nationality: DPRK

Annex II

Asset Freeze (Entities)

1. KOREA UNITED DEVELOPMENT BANK

   a. *Description*: Korea United Development Bank operates in the financial services industry of the DPRK economy.

   b. *Location*: Pyongyang, North Korea; SWIFT/BIC: KUDBKPPY

2. ILSIM INTERNATIONAL BANK

   a. *Description*: Ilsim International Bank is affiliated with the DPRK military and has a close relationship with Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC). Ilsim International Bank has attempted to evade United Nations sanctions.

   b. *AKA*: n/a

   c. *Location*: Pyongyang, DPRK; SWIFT: ILSIKPPY

3. KOREA DAESONG BANK

   a. *Description*: Daesong Bank is owned and controlled by Office 39 of the Korea Workers' Party.

   b. *AKA*: Choson Taesong Unhaeng; AKA: Taesong Bank

   c. *Location*: Segori-dong, Gyongheung St. Potonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK; SWIFT/BIC: KDBKKPPY

4. SINGWANG ECONOMICS AND TRADING GENERAL CORPORATION

   a. *Description*: Singwang Economics and Trading General Corporation is a DPRK firm for trading in coal. DPRK generates a significant share of the money for its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes by mining natural resources and selling those resources abroad.

   b. *AKA*: n/a

   c. *Location*: DPRK

5. KOREA FOREIGN TECHNICAL TRADE CENTER

   a. *Description*: Korea Foreign Technical Trade Center is a DPRK firm trading in coal. DPRK generates a significant share of the funds needed to finance its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes by mining natural resources and selling those resources abroad.

   b. *AKA*: n/a

   c. *Location*: DPRK

6. KOREA PUGANG TRADING CORPORATION

   a. *Description*: Korea Pugang Trading Corporation is owned by the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation, DPRK's defense conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defense industries and support to Pyongyang's military related sales.

   b. *AKA*: n/a

   c. *Location*: Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK

7. KOREA INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL JOINT VENTURE COMPANY

   a. *Description*: Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Company is a subsidiary of Korea Ryonbong General Corporation — DPRK's defense conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defense industries and support to Pyongyang's military related sales — and has engaged in proliferation-related transactions.

   b. *AKA*: Choson International Chemicals Joint Operation Company; AKA: Chosun International Chemicals Joint Operation Company; AKA: International Chemical Joint Venture Company

   c. *Location*: Hamhung, South Hamgyong Province, DPRK; Location: Man gyongdae-kuyok, Pyongyang, DPRK; Location: Mangyungdae-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK

8. DCB FINANCE LIMITED

   a. *Description*: DCB Finance Limited is a front company for Daedong Credit Bank (DCB), a listed entity.

   b. *AKA*: n/a

   c. *Locations*: Akara Building, 24 de Castro Street, Wickhams Cay I, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands; Dalian, China

9. KOREA TAESONG TRADING COMPANY

   a. *Description*: Korea Taesong Trading Company has acted on behalf of KOMID in dealings with Syria.

   b. *AKA*: n/a

   c. *Location*: Pyongyang, DPRK

10. KOREA DAESONG GENERAL TRADING CORPORATION

   a. *Description*: Korea Daesong General Trading Corporation is affiliated with Office 39 through minerals (gold) exports, metals, machinery, agricultural products, ginseng, jewelry, and light industry products.

   b. *AKA*: Daesong Trading; Daesong Trading Company; Korea Daesong Trading Company; Korea Daesong Trading Corporation

   c. *Location*: Pulgan Gori Dong 1, Potonggang District, Pyongyang City, DPRK

Annex III

Items, Materials, Equipment, Goods and Technology

Nuclear- and/or Missile-usable Items

1. Isocyanates (TDI (Toluene di-isocyanate), MDI (Methylene bis (phenyl isocyanate)), IPDI (Isophorone diisocyanate), HNMDI or HDI (Hexamethylene diisocyanate), and DDI (dimeryl diisocyanate) and production equipment.
2. Ammonium nitrate, chemically pure or in phase stabilized version (PSAN).
3. Non-destructive test chambers with a 1m or more critical internal dimension.
4. Turbo-pumps for liquid or hybrid rocket engines.
5. Polymeric Substances (Hydroxyl Terminated Poly-Ether (HTPE), Hydroxyl Terminated Caprolactone Ether (HTCE), Polypropylene glycol (PPG), Polydiethyleneglycol adipate (PGA) and Polyethylene Glycol (PEG)).
6. Inertial equipment for any application, particularly for civilian aircraft, satellite, geophysical survey applications and their associated test equipment.
7. Countermeasure Subsystems and Penetration Aids (e.g. jammers, chaff, decoys) designed to saturate, confuse, or evade missile defences.
8. Manganese metal Brazing Foils.
9. Hydroforming machines.
10. Thermal treatment furnaces — Temperature >850 degrees C and one dimension >1m.
11. Electrical Discharge Machines (EDMs).
12. Friction stir welding machines.
13. Modelling and design software related to the modelling of aerodynamic and thermodynamic analysis of rocket or unmanned aerial vehicle systems.
14. High-speed imaging cameras except those used in medical imaging systems.
15. Truck chassis with 6 or more axles.

Chemical/Biological Weapons-usable Items

1. Floor-mounted fume hoods (walk-in style) with a minimum nominal width of 2.5 meters.
2. Batch centrifuges with a rotor capacity of 4 L or greater, usable with biological materials.
3. Fermenters with an internal volume of 10-20 L (.01-.02 cubic meters), usable with biological materials.

Annex IV

Luxury Goods

(1) Rugs and tapestries (valued greater than $500)

(2) Tableware of porcelain or bone china (valued greater than $100)

Annex V

Standard Form for Notification of Import of Coal From the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

pursuant to paragraph 26 (b) of resolution 2321 (2016)

This form notifies the UN Security Council 1718 Committee of the procurement of coal from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in keeping with the relevant provisions of resolution 2321 (2016).

Procuring State:

Month:

Year:

Coal imported from DPRK, in metric tons:

Coal imported from DPRK, in US dollars (optional):

Additional information (optional):

Signature/seal:

Date:

United Nations S/2016/1000

Security Council

Distr.: General
6 December 2016
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 29 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit information bulletins from the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 23-28 November 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the text of the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Churkin**

16-21615 (E) 081216 131216

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 29 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (23 November 2016)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, a reconciliation agreement has been signed with the representatives of one populated area in Damascus governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 972.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with field commanders of illegal armed groups in Damascus governorate and armed opposition units in Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Qunaytirah governorates.

Over the past 24 hours, 16 ceasefire application forms have been signed with the leaders of armed groups. The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire has increased to 86.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Over the past 24 hours, there were 38 reports of shelling by armed groups in Aleppo governorate (18), Damascus governorate (18), Hama governorate (1) and Ladhiqiyah governorate (1).

Armed groups that had earlier announced a cessation of hostilities used improvised multiple-launch rocket systems, mortars and small arms to fire on a number of populated areas.

In Aleppo governorate, armed elements of the Syrian Free Army shelled the Azizi neighbourhood in Aleppo city.

In Damascus governorate, armed units affiliated with the Army of Islam opposition group shelled Bludan, Jawbar (twice), Kafr Batna, Qassa' and Kanakir; the highway near Duma; and government troop positions near Abu Ali mountain in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

In Aleppo governorate, the terrorist groups Jabhat Fath al-Sham (Nusrah Front) and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) used grenade launchers, tube artillery, mortars and small arms to fire on Bakartayah and also on the Aqil (twice), Aryan (twice), Layramun, 1070, Amiriyan (twice), Binyamin, Ashrafiyah, Shaykh Sa'd and Salihin neighbourhoods, the Castello trade centre (twice) and areas near the watermelon market and the Hikmah School in Aleppo city.

In Damascus governorate, terrorists shelled Hawsh Nasri, Harasta, Irbin, Harasta al-Qantarah, Jawbar (twice) and Khan al-Shih, the Wafidin camp (twice), the highway near Duma and the Ibn al-Walid Hospital.

In Hama governorate, terrorists shelled Aqrab al-Safi.

The Russian and Syrian air forces did not carry out any strikes against opposition armed groups which had announced that they would cease hostilities and had informed the Russian or American reconciliation centres of their location.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours three humanitarian operations were carried out, during which the following humanitarian cargoes were delivered to civilians:

- 1.5 tons to the Siryan al-Qadim district in Aleppo city
- Approximately 1 ton to Ladhiqiyah for refugees from the captured city of Raqqah; and approximately 300 kg for the Dar community of Russian compatriots in Syria

Centres providing hot meals and supplying urgent necessities are continuing to operate for civilians who leave districts of Aleppo city that are under the control of illegal armed groups.

Additional information

Over the past 24 hours, 12 civilians and six fighters have left besieged areas of Aleppo city.

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (24 November 2016)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, reconciliation agreements have been signed with representatives of four populated areas in Tartus governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 976.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with field commanders of illegal armed groups in Damascus governorate and armed opposition units in Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 86.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Over the past 24 hours, there were 38 reports of shelling by armed groups in Damascus governorate (20), Aleppo governorate (16), Suwayda' governorate (1) and Ladhiqiyah governorate (1).

Armed groups that had earlier announced a cessation of hostilities used mortars and small arms to fire on a number of populated areas.

In Damascus governorate, armed units affiliated with the Army of Islam opposition group shelled Harasta (twice), Jawbar (twice), Kafr Batna and Qassa', and also the highway near Duma.

In Aleppo governorate, armed elements of the Syrian Free Army shelled the Salah al-Din neighbourhood in Aleppo city.

In Ladhiqiyah governorate, armed elements of Ahrar al-Sham shelled Abu Ali mountain.

In Aleppo governorate, the terrorist groups Jabhat Fath al-Sham (Nusrah Front) and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) used multiple-launch rocket systems, tube artillery, mortars, anti-tank grenade launchers and small arms to fire on Bakartayah and also on the 1070, Dahiyat al-Assad, Amiriyah (twice), Ashrafiyah (twice), Maydan, Layramun, Salihin, Binyamin and Aryan neighbourhoods, the Castello trade centre (twice) and the area near the watermelon market in Aleppo city.

The following were shelled in Damascus governorate: Harasta al-Qantarah, Irbin (three times), Harasta, Hawsh Nasri (twice) and Jawbar (four times), the Wafidin camp and the highway near Duma.

In Suwayda' governorate, terrorists shelled the Tha'lah airfield.

The Russian and Syrian air forces did not carry out any strikes against opposition armed groups which had announced that they would cease hostilities and had informed the Russian or American reconciliation centres of their location.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours three humanitarian operations were carried out, during which the following humanitarian cargoes were delivered to civilians:

- Approximately 150 kg to Jurin (military field hospital) in Hama governorate
- Approximately 500 kg near Aleppo University in Aleppo city
- Approximately 1 ton to Ayn al-Shariqyah in Ladhiqiyah governorate

Centres providing hot meals and supplying urgent necessities are continuing to operate for civilians who leave districts of Aleppo city that are under the control of illegal armed groups.

Additional information

Over the past 24 hours, eight civilians and five fighters have left besieged areas of Aleppo city.

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (25 November 2016)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, reconciliation agreements have been signed with representatives of two populated areas in Damascus and Ladhiqiyah governorates.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 978.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with field commanders of armed groups in Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 86.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Over the past 24 hours, there were 34 reports of shelling by armed groups in Aleppo governorate (17), Damascus governorate (12), Hama governorate (2), Ladhiqiyah governorate (2) and Qunaytirah governorate (1).

Armed groups that had earlier announced a cessation of hostilities used mortars and small arms to fire on a number of populated areas.

In Aleppo governorate, armed elements of the Syrian Free Army shelled Nayrab and the Salah al-Din neighbourhood in Aleppo city.

In Damascus governorate, armed units affiliated with the Army of Islam opposition group fired on Qassa', the highway near Duma and the area near Abbasiyin stadium in Jawbar.

In Ladhiqiyah governorate, units of the Ahrar al-Sham group shelled Mortlu and government troop positions on Abu Ali mountain.

In Aleppo governorate, the terrorist groups Jabhat Fath al-Sham (Nusrah Front) and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) used multiple-launch rocket systems, tube artillery, mortars, anti-tank grenade launchers and small arms to fire on the Amri, Ard Sabah, Aqil, Binyamin, Ashrafiyah, Ansari, Dahiyat al-Assad, 1070, Zahrat Awwad and Layramun neighbourhoods, and also areas near the watermelon market, the gasworks and the Castello trade centre in Aleppo city.

In Damascus governorate, terrorists shelled Bahariyah, Irbin, Dahiyat al-Assad, Hawsh Nasri and an electric power station in Jawbar.

In Hama governorate, terrorists shelled Mu'ardis and the thermal electric power station in Muhradah; and Jabha in Qunaytirah governorate.

The Russian and Syrian air forces did not carry out any strikes against opposition armed groups which had announced that they would cease hostilities and had informed the Russian or American reconciliation centres of their location.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours three humanitarian operations were carried out, during which the following humanitarian cargoes were delivered to civilians:

- 700 kg to the Sulaymaniyah district of Aleppo city (for civilians and refugees)
- 3 tons of medical equipment to the Mogambo district in Aleppo city
- Approximately 1.5 tons to Mu'allaqah in Damascus governorate

Centres providing hot meals and supplying urgent necessities are continuing to operate for civilians who leave districts of Aleppo city that are under the control of illegal armed groups.

Additional information

Over the past 24 hours, 17 civilians have left besieged areas of Aleppo city.

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (26 November 2016)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, reconciliation agreements have been signed with representatives of eight populated areas in Damascus (4) and Ladhiqiyah (4) governorates.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 986.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with field commanders of armed groups in Damascus governorate and armed opposition units in Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 86.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Over the past 24 hours, there were 43 reports of shelling by illegal armed groups in Aleppo governorate (20), Damascus governorate (16), Ladhiqiyah governorate (3), Dar'a governorate (2), Hama governorate (1) and Qunaytirah governorate (1).

In Damascus governorate, armed units affiliated with the Army of Islam opposition group used mortars and small arms to fire on Jawbar and Qassa', the highway near Duma and the area near Abbasiyin stadium in Jawbar.

In Ladhiqiyah governorate, units of the Ahrar al-Sham group shelled Ayn al-Qantarah and government troop positions near Abu Ali mountain (twice).

In Aleppo governorate, armed elements of the Syrian Free Army used multiple-launch rocket systems to shell the Bayadah and Salah al-Din neighbourhoods in Aleppo city.

In Aleppo governorate, the terrorist groups Jabhat Fath al-Sham (Nusrah Front) and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) used multiple-launch rocket systems, tube artillery, mortars and small arms to fire on Shurfah and also on the Binyamin (twice), Dahiyat al-Assad, Jam'iyat al-Fayha', Amri, Ashrafiyah, Ard Sabah, Aquil, 1070 and Zahrat Awwad neighbourhoods, the Castello trade centre (three times), the Assad Military Academy and the area near the former military school and the Hikmah School in Aleppo city.

In Damascus governorate, the following were shelled: Hawsh Nasri (twice), Irbin (four times) Dahiyat al-Assad and Bilaliyah, an electric power station in Jawbar, the Wafidin camp, a sports grounds in Jawbar and Ibn Sina Hospital.

In Dar'a governorate, terrorists shelled Tall Sheliyah and Shaykh Miskin.

Muhradah was shelled in Hama governorate; and Jabha in Qunaytirah governorate.

The Russian and Syrian air forces did not carry out any strikes against opposition armed groups which had announced that they would cease hostilities and had informed the Russian or American reconciliation centres of their location.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours three humanitarian operations were carried out, during which the following humanitarian cargoes were delivered to civilians:

- Approximately 1.5 tons for citizens of the Salah al-Din district in Aleppo city
- Approximately 2 tons to a camp for refugees from eastern Aleppo in Ashrafiyah district
- Approximately 1 ton to Huraqi in Homs governorate

Centres providing hot meals and supplying urgent necessities are continuing to operate for civilians who leave districts of Aleppo city that are under the control of illegal armed groups.

Additional information

Over the past 24 hours, four civilians have left besieged areas of Aleppo city.

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (27 November 2016)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, reconciliation agreements have been signed with representatives of four populated areas in Ladhiqiyah governorate (2), Hama governorate (1) and Suwayda' governorate (1).

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,000.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with field commanders of illegal armed groups in Damascus governorate and armed opposition units in Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 86.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Over the past 24 hours, there were 39 reports of shelling by illegal armed groups in Aleppo governorate (18), Damascus governorate (15), Dar'a governorate (4), Ladhiqiyah governorate (1) and Qunaytirah governorate (1).

In Damascus governorate, armed units affiliated with the Army of Islam opposition group used mortars and small arms to fire on Jawbar (twice), Qassa' and the highway near Duma.

In Aleppo, armed elements of the Syrian Free Army used mortars to shell the Salah-al-Din neighbourhood.

In Ladhiqiyah governorate, fighters from the Ahrar al-Sham group used small arms to fire on Ayn al-Qantarah.

In Aleppo city, the terrorist groups Jabhat Fath al-Sham (Nusrah Front) and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) used mortars, handheld anti-tank grenade launchers and small arms to fire on the Amri, Binyamin (twice), Jam'iyat al-Fayha' and Hananu-4 (twice) neighbourhoods, the Jandul roundabout, the Karm al-Jazmati, Dahiyat al-Assad, Zahrat Awwad, 1070 and Ashrafiyah neighbourhoods, the Assad Military Academy (twice), the Castello trade centre (twice) and the Hikmah School.

In Damascus governorate, the following were shelled: Irbin (three times), Bilaliyah, Hawsh Kharabu (three times), the Wafidin camp and Jawbar (three times).

In Dar'a governorate, terrorists shelled Tall Sheliyah, Khirbat al-Ghazalah, Sanamayn and the highway near Jadilah.

Jabha was shelled in Qunaytirah governorate.

The Russian and Syrian air forces did not carry out any strikes against opposition armed groups which had announced that they would cease hostilities and had informed the Russian or American reconciliation centres of their location.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours three humanitarian operations were carried out, during which the following humanitarian cargoes were delivered to civilians:

- Approximately 1 ton to Ashrafiyah and 3 tons to Ummaliyah in Aleppo city
- Approximately 1 ton to Hadidah in Homs governorate

Centres providing hot meals and supplying urgent necessities are continuing to operate for civilians who leave districts of Aleppo city that are under the control of illegal armed groups.

Additional information

In the course of operations carried out by the Armed Forces of the Syrian Arab Republic to liberate the eastern districts of Aleppo city, 42 fighters from the Qadisiyah district renounced the continuation of hostilities and laid down their weapons.

An amnesty, announced earlier in a decree of the President of Syria, applies to all members of armed groups who have laid down their weapons.

On 27 November, Syrian government troops liberated eight neighourhoods in eastern Aleppo from terrorists.

More than 2,500 civilians have been evacuated from the liberated neighourhoods, including over 800 children; 500 people left from the Qadisiyah district and approximately 1,500 people from the Jabal Badro and Sakhur districts.

Several fighters attempted to leave the besieged areas in the guise of civilians and were detained on the spot.

To prevent casualties among the civilian population, negotiations are under way in a number of the city's districts on the voluntary surrender of weapons by fighters.

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (28 November 2016)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, reconciliation agreements have been signed with representatives of three populated areas in Ladhiqiyah governorate (2) and Hama governorate (1).

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,003.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with field commanders of illegal armed groups in Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 86.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Over the past 24 hours, there were 45 reports of shelling by armed groups in Aleppo governorate (24), Damascus governorate (13), Hama governorate (3), Ladhiqiyah governorate (2), Dar'a governorate (2) and Qunaytirah governorate (1).

In Damascus governorate, armed units affiliated with the Army of Islam opposition group used mortars and small arms to fire on the area near the Abbasiyin stadium in Jawbar.

Ahrar al-Sham fighters used mortars to shell Rasha in Ladhiqiyah governorate and Shaykh Khidr in Aleppo city.

Syrian Free Army units used "hellfire" multiple-launch rocket systems and mortars to shell the Mashariqah and Ansari neighbourhoods in Aleppo city, and also tube artillery to shell Sandiran in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

In Aleppo governorate, the terrorist groups Jabhat Fath al-Sham (Nusrah Front) and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) used multiple-launch rocket systems, tube artillery, mortars and small arms to fire on the Binyamin, Bayadin, Ramusah, Shaykh Najjar, Aryan, Dahiyat al-Assad, Sakhur-3, 1070, Layramun, Sakhur and Shaykh Khidr neighbourhoods, and on the Castello trade centre, the Assad Military Academy and the Hikmah School in Aleppo city.

In Damascus governorate, the following were shelled: Irbin, Hawsh Nasri, Bilaliyah and Hawsh Kharabu, a sports ground and an electric power station in Jawbar, and the Wafidin camp.

Terrorists also shelled Tall Sheliyah and Jadilah in Dar'a governorate; and Suran and the thermal electric power station in Muhradah in Hama governorate.

Fighters from Jabhat Fath al-Sham fired tank artillery at Durin in Qunaytirah governorate.

The Russian and Syrian air forces did not carry out any strikes against opposition armed groups which had announced that they would cease hostilities and had informed the Russian or American reconciliation centres of their location.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours three humanitarian operations were carried out, during which the following humanitarian cargoes were delivered to civilians:

- Approximately 7 tons to Jibrin in Aleppo governorate
- 2.5 tons to Asili in Hama governorate
- Approximately 1 ton to Kafr Abd in Homs governorate

Centres providing hot meals and supplying urgent necessities are continuing to operate for civilians who leave districts of Aleppo city that are under the control of illegal armed groups.

United Nations S/2016/1001

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 November 2016
English
Original: French

Letter dated 28 November 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a communiqué, forwarded by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, on strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union that was adopted by the African Union Peace and Security Council at its 628th meeting (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring this communiqué to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

16-21049 (E) 051216 051216

Please recycle

Annex

[Original: English]

On behalf of the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, I would like to forward, herewith attached, the communiqué on strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on issues of peace and security in Africa adopted by the African Union Peace and Security Council at its 628th meeting, held in Addis Ababa on 29 September 2016 (see enclosure).

The Commission would appreciate it if this communiqué were circulated to members of the United Nations Security Council.

(*Signed*) Smail **Chergui**
Ambassador
African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security

Enclosure

[Original: English]

Communiqué

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 628th meeting, held on 29 September 2016, was briefed by the Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Smail Chergui, and the United Nations Special Representative to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), Haile Menkerios, on strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on issues of peace and security in Africa and adopted the following decision:

Council:

1. **Takes note** of the briefings provided by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security and the United Nations Special Representative to the African Union and Head of UNOAU, as well as the statements delivered by the representatives of China, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States of America;

2. **Recalls** its previous press statements and communiqués on African Union-United Nations partnership, in particular the communiqué [PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCVII)] of its 307th meeting, held on 9 January 2012, which considered the report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the partnership between the AU and the United Nations on peace and security;

3. **Welcomes** the report of the United Nations Secretary-General on strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on issues of peace and security in Africa, including the work of the United Nations Office to the African Union (S/2016/780), which emphasizes the need for new and stronger ways to address international peace and security challenges and renews the United Nations commitment to strengthen partnership between the two organizations on the basis of collective responsibility to respond early, coherently and decisively to prevent and manage conflicts;

4. **Commends** the significant progress made in African Union-United Nations partnership in the past five years and **stresses** that it develops into a systematic, predictable and strategic one. Furthermore, Council **welcomes** the signing by the United Nations Secretariat and the AU Commission of an overarching framework on enhancing partnership in peace and security in Africa;

5. **Recognizes** the primacy of the United Nations Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, as defined by the Charter of the United Nations and **acknowledges** the need for Africa to enhance its capacity to address the scourge of conflicts on the continent. In this regard, Council **stresses** the importance of further strengthening the partnership between the AU Peace and Security Council and the Security Council consistent with Chapter VII of the Charter for the enhancement of coordination on peace and security issues in Africa, to ensure that AU views are taken into account;

6. **Reiterates its call** for a division of labour based on comparative advantages, burden-sharing and consultative decision-making between the AU Peace and Security Council and the Security Council in addressing peace and security challenges in Africa, as a way forward to forging meaningful partnerships between the two organizations. Consistent with such a framework, Council further **reiterates its appeal** to the United Nations for the use of United Nations assessed contributions in support of AU peace support operations, as recommended in the report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, which called on the United Nations to consider providing support from assessed contributions, on a case-by-case basis, for those AU peace support operations authorized by the Security Council;

7. **Reaffirms** the importance of mobilizing more significant resources from within the continent in support of the AU peace and security agenda. In this regard, Council **calls on** all AU member States to foster the process aiming at finding practical and consensual ways on how to effectively implement Assembly decision Assembly/AU/Dec.605(XXVII) relating to the Peace Fund, as endorsed by the Assembly at its 27th Ordinary Session, held in Kigali in July 2016;

8. **Underscores** the important role played by the African members in the Security Council to defend the African common positions in the Security Council and **emphasizes** the need for the African members to maintain unity in the interaction within the Security Council;

9. **Notes** the close cooperation that exists between the AU Commission and the United Nations Secretariat, including the consultations among senior officials and the holding of regular desk-to-desk meetings and **encourages** them to pursue and intensify their efforts towards greater coordination and collaboration Council **stresses** the need to take all appropriate measures to ensure that the AU Commission is adequately resourced to strengthen the strategic partnership with the United Nations in the area of peace and security, and **calls upon** the Security Council to consider authorizing the strengthening of its secretariat to achieve this objective;

10. **Decides, in this regard**, to continue its efforts to strengthen collaboration with the Security Council, including, among others, by increasing dialogue and implementation of the conclusions adopted by the AU Peace and Security Council and the Security Council during the annual joint consultative meetings, aiming at fostering closer coordination and cooperation between the two organizations;

11. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2016/1002

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 November 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 29 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to bring to your attention that the so-called "Political Council" of the Houthi and Saleh rebels in Sana'a announced on 28 November 2016 the formation of the so-called "National Salvation Government" (see annex), which is not only considered a new illegitimate and unconstitutional body formed by those involved in the coup but also constitutes a new measure thwarting the peace consultations led by the United Nations in accordance with the terms agreed upon for establishing peace in Yemen in the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative and its implementation mechanism, the National Dialogue Conference outcomes and Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 2216 (2015).

The Government of the Republic of Yemen firmly rejects this unilateral step and urges the Security Council to shoulder its responsibilities and take the action necessary for condemning such a move that will have an impact on the peace process. My Government also reiterates its adherence to the United Nations-led consultations and supports the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis in Yemen in accordance with the agreed terms.

I would greatly appreciate it if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Khaled H. **Alyemany**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-21111 (E) 061216 061216

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 29 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]

Office of the President: The steps taken by the militia in Sana'a confirm that it is committed to coup tactics, but the accomplices to the coup will be held to account

An influential source in the Office of the President has made the following statement:

> The Houthi and Saleh militia has declared a so-called government in Sana'a. That step is yet another sign to our people and the world that the forces behind the coup are committed to their coup tactics. It crushes any possibility of dialogue or peace, and underscores the reality that the militias are lashing out against any attempt to bring security or stability. They are persisting in their deluded endeavour to spread anarchy and destruction, sponsor terrorism and tear the nation apart.

In a statement to the Yemeni news agency Saba, the source went on to say:

> The step taken by the militia shows the world, and any person of good faith, that the renegades are bent on wreaking destruction, tearing society apart and igniting conflict. It confirms what we, along with all patriotic and peace-loving forces, have been saying to the world, namely that their response to calls for a peaceful solution has been deceitful. They have shown clear disdain for any initiative put forward by the international community, and their attitude to our people has been spiteful and irresponsible.
>
> We have consistently kept our hand outstretched in order to spare our country any violence or clashes. We have done so because we are concerned for our people, mindful of our responsibilities and committed to the principle of allegiance to the nation. We have taken a sincere approach to any call for peace. We have continued to call on the international community to assume its responsibility to enforce the authoritative international resolutions. The latter are the best way to restore stability, which can ultimately be secured only once the coup has come to a definitive end. Unfortunately, the international community's listless and indulgent approach has emboldened the coup militias and given them the impression that the coup has gained international acceptance, encouraging them to take further steps to consolidate the coup.

The source argued that the militia's actions in Sana'a confirmed that it was persisting with its coup strategy. It was therefore essential for the region and the world to be aware of the threat posed by the militia, which was working to spread anarchy and foster disregard for laws and norms. That trend posed a threat to the region as a whole, and not only to Yemen.

The source went on:

> We are following those steps, which will not dent our people's united stand against the coup. On the contrary, it will strengthen our people's determination to bring an end to the coup and the militia, and to strip the latter of its weapons. This step brings an end to all of the efforts for peace that we and the world have endeavoured to build. It highlights the need for the region and the world to take a more genuine stand against the coup and effectively enforce the authoritative international resolutions by strengthening the legitimate State institutions and eradicating any aspect of the coup.

He stressed that any persons who had taken part in the various stages of the coup, including joining the so-called committees, councils or government, were accomplices to the coup process and would be subject to the full range of legal proceedings in the context of regional and international cooperation. Anyone who had been duped into doing so should promptly dissociate themselves from the coup measures.

The source said that legal proceedings would indeed be taken against the coup authors who were wanted by the law. The sanctions committee was taking action and would pursue the soldiers, politicians and businessmen who had supported the coup. The blood of the martyrs and the sacrifices of Yemenis would not go to waste.

He called on international sponsors and, in particular, the United Nations, the Members of the Security Council, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council and all friendly and kindred countries to condemn the recent steps; hold the coup militias responsible for the collapse of dialogue and peace; work promptly to support legitimate processes and eradicate coup remnants; refrain from interacting with or hosting any outlaw group, such as the Houthi and Saleh militias, including members of the coup authors' so-called government; and be mindful of the threat posed by the militias' actions, which endangered regional and international peace.

Aden: saba.net
29 November 2016